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DRAFT 
 
The Cost of Doing Business: Corporate Crime and Punishment Post-Crisis 
Dorothy S. Lund & Natasha Sarin 
 
Abstract 
 
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have 
debated whether corporate criminal enforcement overdeters beneficial corporate activity or in the 
alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. This debate has recently expanded in its 
polarization: On the one hand, academics, judges, and politicians have excoriated the DOJ for 
failing to send guilty bankers to jail in the wake of the financial crisis; on the other, the DOJ has 
since relaxed policies aimed to secure individual lability and reduced the size of fines and number 
of prosecutions.   
 
A crucial and yet understudied piece of evidence in this conversation is how crime has 
responded to our enforcement regime. In the last few decades, the DOJ has embraced many law 
and economics enforcement tenets including entity liability over individual liability, fewer 
prosecutions and a greater number of settlements, and high fines over jail time. And several papers 
have documented these enforcement trends in detail. However, unlike every other type of crime, 
the government does not collect data about corporate crime levels. Therefore, we cannot tell how 
corporations are responding to these enforcement practices. 
 
In this paper, we take important first steps in determining how corporate crime, and 
financial institution crime in particular, is responding to the DOJ’s enforcement regime and its 
shifting priorities. Specifically, we proxy for financial crime using three novel sources: the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), consumer 
complaints made to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and whistleblower 
complaints made to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Each source reveals a steep 
increase in complaints or reports indicative of financial institution misconduct. We also examine 
levels of public company recidivism, which are also on the rise. And we document a potential 
cause: recidivist companies are much larger than non-recidivist companies, but they receive 
smaller fines than non-recidivist companies (measured as a percentage of assets and revenue). In 
theory, high fines can supply adequate deterrence by themselves, but our results indicate that it 
might not be politically feasible to levy a sufficiently high fine to deter future incidents of corporate 
crime. Put differently, for large companies, criminal penalties may be just another cost of doing 
business—and quite a reasonable cost at that.  We conclude by offering recommendations for 
enforcement agencies and policymakers. In particular, we observe that many of the assumptions 
inherent to classical law and economics theory are inaccurate with respect to white-collar crime. 
Fines large enough to deter malfeasance are large and potentially infinite—well outside the 
possibility set for policymakers. The DOJ should therefore consider other ways of securing 
deterrence, such as by increasing penalties against guilty individuals. 
 
 Assistant Professor of Law, USC Gould School of Law. 
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Assistant Professor of Finance, The 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. We thank Jennifer Arlen, Cary Coglianese, Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Dave Hoffman, Saul Levmore, Larry Summers, Andrew Verstein, and participants in the Penn Law 
School Faculty Retreat for helpful comments, and Hayk Badalyan and Joe Kupferberg for excellent research 
assistance. 
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The Cost of Doing Business: Corporate Crime and Punishment Post-Crisis 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In 2016, California utility company PG&E was convicted of multiple felony violations, after a 
five-and-a-half-week jury trial.1 Six years earlier, a PG&E gas pipeline had exploded, flattening a 
neighborhood in San Bruno, California and killing eight people.2 The prosecution presented 
evidence that, before the accident, the utility company failed to address and investigate threats to 
its pipelines and never took action to correct problems once they had been identified. The company 
allegedly also violated federal safety regulations and misled regulators who investigated the 
accident. PG&E was ultimately fined $3 million—the maximum statutory penalty—and given five 
years “probation,” which subjected the company to a corporate monitor and required it to pay for 
advertising publicizing its criminal conduct and engage in community service.3 In accordance with 
its usual practice, the DOJ did not charge any individuals. 
 
The DOJ celebrated the sentence as a major victory. A U.S. Attorney announced: “While the 
conviction and sentence in this case will not bring back those who were lost … it does take 
necessary steps toward ensuring PG&E will never again engage in this type of criminal behavior 
that puts all of its customers at substantial risk.”4  
 
The celebratory sentiment was short lived. Less than two years later, PG&E power lines caused 
the deadliest wildfire in California history, killing eighty-six people and destroying an entire town.5 
PG&E has since disclosed that it had inspected the towers involved shortly before the fire, 
suggesting that the company was aware of problems with the lines.6 A grand jury has been 
empaneled, and, according to the California Attorney General’s office, the company may face 
criminal charges once again.7 PG&E has already sought bankruptcy protection as a result of an 
estimated $30 billion in liabilities related to the wildfire.8 
  
This is not an isolated example. In the financial sector alone, last year brought successful 
enforcement actions against Wells Fargo for fake accounts,9 the Royal Bank of Scotland for its 
 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, PG&E Ordered to Develop Compliance and Ethics Program as Part of Its 
Sentence for Engaging in Criminal Conduct (Jan. 26, 2017) [hereinafter PG&E Press Release], https://www.
justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/pge-ordered-develop-compliance-and-ethics-program-part-its-sentence-engaging-criminal.  
2 Michael Hiltzik, How the Criminal Conviction of PG&E Lets the Real Wrongdoers Go Free, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2016, 12:20 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pge-criminal-20160810-snap-story.html. 
3 PG&E Press Release, supra note 1.  
4 Id. (emphasis added).  
5 Russell Gold, PG&E Power Line that Sparked Camp Fire Was Inspected Weeks Earlier, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 
2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-power-line-that-sparked-camp-fire-was-inspected-weeks-
earlier-11566466203. 
6 Mark Chediak & Pamela A. Maclean, PG&E May Face Criminal Charges After Probe of Deadly Wildfires, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 9, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-09/pg-e-may-face-
criminal-charges-after-probe-of-deadly-wildfires (describing evidence that California knew about violations of law 
by PG&E in connection with the fires). 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo Just Got Hit with Another Penalty for the Financial Crisis. This Time, It’s $2.1 Billion, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/08/01/wells-fargo-financial-crisis-fine-mortgage-backed-
security/.  
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sales of risky assets leading up to the financial crisis,10 Barclays for its attempt to unmask a 
whisteblower,11 HSBC for money laundering,12 Société Generale for sanctions violations,13 and 
more. And the growing uneasiness about corporate malfeasance has prompted calls for action. 
Notably, Senator Elizabeth Warren has introduced a bill that would authorize prosecution of an 
executive officer of any corporation that generates more than $1 billion in annual revenue for 
negligently permitting or failing to prevent a criminal or civil violation by the company.14  
 
This bill, if passed, would allow for a drastic change in enforcement practice. The PG&E 
criminal trial is representative of the current corporate criminal enforcement regime in two main 
ways: first, individuals are very rarely charged, and second, the main disciplinary mechanism is 
the imposition of a hefty fine.15 Indeed, the unique aspect of the PG&E trial is that it made it as far 
as it did: today, the vast majority of criminal suits against corporations are settled early on, using 
deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) or non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”).16 The trend 
toward higher fines, fewer trials, and no individual charges has been underway for some time, and 
has accelerated in the past few years.17 Today, corporate enforcement activity is lower than it has 
been in decades.18  
 
In theory, the DOJ’s enforcement regime could be operating optimally, even at reduced levels. 
The principal aim of a corporate criminal liability is deterrence—other goals, such as retribution 
or incapacitation, make less sense when the subject of the penalty is a legal entity. And law and 
economics scholars have been influential in theorizing how to efficiently deter corporate 
misconduct. Importantly, the optimal amount of corporate crime is unlikely to be zero:19 
eliminating all corporate crime would be very expensive, and the benefit would likely be dwarfed 
 
10 Julia Kollewe, RBS Settles US Department of Justice Investigation with $4.9bn Fine, THE GUARDIAN (May 10, 
2018, 2:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/10/rbs-settles-us-department-of-justice-
investigation-with-49bn-fine.  
11 Kalyeena Makortoff, Barclays Hit with $15m Fine Over Attempts to Unmask Whistleblower, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 18, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/18/barclays-hit-with-15m-fine-over-
attempts-to-unmask-whistleblower.  
12 Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 
10, 2012, 9:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-
laundering-case-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211. 
13 Katanga Johnson et al., Societe Generale to Pay $1.4 Billion to Settle Cases in the U.S., REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2018, 
9:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-socgen/societe-generale-to-pay-1-4-billion-to-settle-cases-in-
the-u-s-idUSKCN1NO26B.  
14 Robert Anello, Employee Liability for Corporate Misconduct--Elizabeth Warren Style: Can Negligence Become 
Criminal?, FORBES (Sep. 18, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/09/18/employee-liability-
for-corporate-misconduct-elizabeth-warren-style-can-negligence-become-criminal/#3a1605da67f1.  
15 See Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-
3) (available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3360456) [hereinafter Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions].  
16 Id. (manuscript at 14-15); see also Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 327 (2017). 
17 See Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 21). 
18 Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Marielle Sanchez, Carrot Replaces Stick: Corporate Crime Enforcement in the Trump 
Administration, L.J. NEWSL. (May 2019),  http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/2019/05/01/carrot-replaces-stick-
corporate-crime-enforcement-in-the-trump-administration/?slreturn=20190907124101.  
19 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968) (stating 
that the optimal penalty should adjust to reflect  the “cost of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of 
punishments - for example, whether they are fines or prison terms - and the responses of offenders to changes in 
enforcement.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537245
 3 
by the cost.20 Therefore, an optimal enforcement regime would weigh the public and private costs 
of enforcement and compare that cost with the social benefit of deterring additional crime. Put 
another way, optimal deterrence occurs when the penalty imposed equals the social cost of crime 
(adjusted upward for the probability that the crime will go undetected).21 Law and economics 
theory also suggests that deterring corporate malfeasance with financial penalties is preferable to 
charging individuals for several reasons.  In particular, it is cheaper for the government to collect 
a fine than to send a person to prison; not only that, pursuing individuals could lead to suboptimal 
levels of employee risk aversion.22  
 
The problem, though, with embracing a law and economics approach to enforcement is that 
fines are not actually calibrated as theory would advise.23 Fines are instead calculated based on a 
pre-determined range contained in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.24 Attempting to estimate the 
social cost of crime would likely be impossible.25 But without being able to calculate what is 
optimal, we have no idea whether fines are being set to deter crime in the way that these theoretical 
models would prescribe.26  
 
The inability to calculate optimal fines might not matter as much if we could study trends in 
corporate activity over time, and calibrate fines and penalties based on that information. However, 
unlike every other type of criminal crime, there is no effort by the government to estimate corporate 
crime levels.27 Thanks to Brandon Garrett, we have excellent data about corporate crime 
enforcement against public companies: the number of prosecutions, convictions, and settlements, 
 
20 See Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Oversight in Hindsight: Assessing the U.S. Regulatory System in the 
Wake of Calamity, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 10 (Cary 
Coglianese ed., 2012) (“the complete elimination of all harms…is not possible without stopping altogether the very 
activities that give rise to these harmful events”).  
21 Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996).  
22 See infra notes 57-59, 70-72 and accompanying text.  
23 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, pt. C (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015) [hereinafter 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES]; see also Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 145 (Alon Harel and Keith N. Hylton, eds., 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) [hereinafter Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability], http://www.ioea.eu/pdf/
textes_2012/LEC-Arlen_Chapter-7.pdf. 
24 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 23, ch. 8, pt. C. The size of the penalty can be adjusted upward for 
culpability factors, such as hindering the investigation, and adjusted downward if the organization has an effective 
compliance program. Id.  
25 Cf. William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment, 
73 SWED. J. OF ECON. 42 (1971).   
26 Fischel and Sykes recognize that “sanctions uncalibrated to the level of harm can have quite a pernicious effect 
when the target of the sanction is a corporation.” Fischel & Sykes, supra note 21, at 323. But they claim that this 
cautions against large sanctions that would overdeter beneficial activity. Id. 
27 White Collar Crime Publications, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=33 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2020) [hereinafter BJS White Collar Reports] (showing that while other types of crime were 
studied more recently, the last estimate of white collar crime occurred in 1983, see DONALD A. MANSON, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRACKING OFFENDERS: WHITE COLLAR CRIMES (1983), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/to-wcc.pdf); see also CINDY R. ALEXANDER & MARK A. COHEN, GEORGE 
MASON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW: LAW & ECON. CTR., TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, DEFERRED 
PROSECUTION, AND PLEA AGREEMENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ALLEGED CORPORATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 
(2015) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION], https://masonlec.org
/site/rte_uploads/files/Full%20Report%20-%20SCJI%20NPA-DPA%2C%20April%202015%281%29.pdf.  
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and the amount of fines levied.28 It is therefore possible to accurately describe the DOJ’s 
enforcement practices and its shifting priorities. It is not possible to determine whether that regime 
is adequately deterring corporate crime. 
 
Pause for a moment to imagine if the same were true for other types of crime. Suppose that the 
police in your city took no steps to measure and quantify the number of robberies each year. As 
such, if there was a steady increase in robberies, the police (and the government agencies with 
authority over the police) would not know about it, nor would they be able to respond. In reality, 
government bodies take great pains to measure the level of violent crime in their jurisdiction, as it 
helps them calibrate whether or not additional steps need to be taken to increase deterrence: 
increased monitoring of vulnerable areas, a quicker response time when calls are received, stronger 
charges in cases against arrestees.29 But for corporate crime—which can affect millions of people’s 
lives, and bring down entire economies—enforcement plows forward blindly, subject to political 
winds and faith in the law and economics models discussed above, rather than taking a clear look 
at whether crime is being adequately deterred.30  
 
In this Article, we take important first steps toward answering the question of whether 
corporate crime is on the rise. Our focus is on corporate crime committed by employees of large 
financial firms.31 We focus on financial institution misconduct because of its importance, and 
because of the heated debate over the government’s response to crime committed by banks in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis.32 An unexplored and yet critically important aspect of this 
conversation is whether crime by financial institutions has risen or fallen in the years after the 
financial crisis. How else can we determine whether the government’s response was adequate?  
 
 
28 Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry [hereinafter Garrett, Corporate 
Prosecution Registry], http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html (last updated 
Aug. 16, 2019). 
29 One exception is data about gun violence, which, as a result of industry lobbying, has been quite limited since 
1996. Samantha Raphelson, How The NRA Worked To Stifle Gun Violence Research, NPR (Apr. 5, 2018, 3:01 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599773911/how-the-nra-worked-to-stifle-gun-violence-research.  
30 ALEXANDER, TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, supra note 27, at 28 (“In comparison with street crime, 
where victimization rates can be tracked over time through victim surveys and by crimes reported to police, there is 
relatively little documentation of the harm from corporate crime or its victims or frequency of occurrence.”). 
31 Note that perceptions of the blameworthiness of firms whose agents commit crime may be affected by industry 
characteristics. We opened this Article by discussing negligence by PG&E, a utilities company whose aging, under-
serviced equipment sparked deadly fires. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. Utilities are heavily regulated, 
and some identify this characteristic as contributing to PG&E’s failures. For example, regulators refused for nearly a 
decade to allow the utility to raise prices to recoup cost increases. Gold, supra note 5. In theory, additional profits 
could have helped the utility address its known weaknesses. Id. There is at least a question of whether it is 
appropriate to think of a heavily regulated utility facing pricing constraints as more of a government subsidiary than 
a typical corporation. By contrast, the case for the blameworthiness of a typical corporation whose agents commit 
crime is stronger. Corporations are often able to collect large (and to many, excessive) rents, meaning that the entity 
is not constrained from taking steps to eliminate harmful behavior. Indeed, a corporation’s business model often 
privileges shareholder wealth over social welfare; therefore, there is a justice-based argument supporting the 
imposition of criminal liability on the entity (and ultimately the shareholders) whenever criminal behavior, or the 
failure to prevent it, benefits shareholders but creates social harm. See Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
32 See supra notes 9-14.  
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We look for proxies for misconduct by financial institutions in an attempt to shed light on 
whether our enforcement regime is adequately deterring financial crime. To proxy for financial 
crime, we utilize three novel sources: the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs),  consumer complaints made to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and whistleblower complaints made to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).33 SAR reports are required to be filed by financial institutions under certain 
circumstances that are highly suggestive of malfeasance, while the CFPB data are generated by 
aggravated consumers of financial products.34 Whistleblower complaints are generally filed by 
employees of banks and companies who suspect that financial crime has occurred; if the 
information leads to a successful enforcement action, the whistleblower is eligible for a large 
bounty.35 
 
Our results are summarized as follows: in the period from 2012 to 2019, we document a steep 
upward trend in SARs filed across every single agency that collects them: the OCC, the FDIC, the 
FHIFA, the NCUA, the FRB, the IRS, and the SEC. This means that financial institutions flagged 
a greater number of transactions suggestive of money laundering, fraud, or other financial crimes 
in each year for the past five years.36 In addition, we document a steep upward trend in consumer 
complaints about financial misconduct submitted to the CFPB from November 2014 to August 
2019. Finally, we also observe a steady increase in whistleblower tips submitted to the SEC from 
2011 to 2018. In sum, our data suggest a steep increase in reports of financial misconduct in three 
unrelated places. 
 
For too long, academics have shied away from an inquiry like ours because of the substantial 
limitations of the data that are available and the difficulty of the project. It is challenging to try and 
isolate the level of reported crime from the enforcement regime. Our inquiry is thus novel—though 
not without imperfections. Changes over time that impact the incidence of financial misconduct 
 
33 We are not the first to try an extrapolate levels of financial misconduct from sources other than enforcement data. 
Indeed, an extensive literature attempts to measure the causes of financial misconduct from three popular databases: 
accounting restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and accounting and auditing enforcement releases. See, 
e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research, 92 ACCT. REV. 141-163 
(2017) (describing these databases). We decided to study different datasets for several reasons. For one, we in many 
ways prefer our datasets because they allow us to study the time trend of post-crisis financial institution misconduct 
across several dimensions beyond securities and accounting fraud. In addition, the accounting restatement are also 
known to be incomplete and misleading. See id. at 142. Of course, any data exercise on these questions is 
imperfect—including the analysis contained in our article, which is why our claims are ultimately quite limited. For 
example, we do not claim to measure actual crime levels, but instead document trends that suggest a rise in financial 
institution crime over time. Cf. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate 
Fraud? (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222608. And we 
hope a contribution of this piece is to encourage the collection of more granular data on instances of corporate 
criminality.  
34 See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-
research/consumer-complaints/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2020); Suspicious Activity Report Statistics Database, FIN. 
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats (last updated Nov. 30, 2019). 
35 See SEC, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 6 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annual-report-whistleblower-
program.pdf (“Awards must be made in an amount that is 10 percent or more and 30 percent or less 
of the monetary sanctions collected.”). 
36 SAR data comprises both business-related and individual suspicious activity. To proxy for corporate crime, we 
isolate SARs referencing institutional insiders (employees, directors, agents, officers, and controlling shareholders). 
See discussion infra Part IIIA. 
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reporting can confound our results. For example, it is possible that following the financial crisis, 
institutions became more careful about reporting suspicious activity, and therefore SAR filings 
increased for that reason. Likewise, perhaps whistleblower tips increased not because of an 
increase in criminality, but because of increased recognition of the large bounties available. And 
finally, perhaps consumers of financial products were simply becoming familiar with a new tool 
provided by a new agency, and that fact explains the increase in complaints made to the CFPB. 
Regarding the latter concern, however, we document a decrease in consumer complaints related 
to mortgages after July 2016; all other complaint types increase. This fall in mortgage complaints 
is consistent with increased scrutiny from the federal government about mortgage practices in the 
years following the financial crisis, as new regulations and regulatory oversight helped eliminate 
abusive practices.37 Although this is not the only plausible explanation—it could be attributable to 
a fall in mortgage delinquencies, for example38—we think that it suggests that the increase in other 
types of complaints is not solely attributable to an increase in consumer familiarity with the 
consumer complaint resource. If that were the sole cause, we would expect to see an increase in 
complaints across all dimensions. 
 
In general, the volatility in our dataseries suggests that we are picking up on something more 
than changes in reporting and enforcement. Taken together, our data shows that corporate crime 
levels rise post-crisis, but in a non-monotonic way. It is certainly possible that this volatility is a 
byproduct of changes in enforcement priorities, but we believe that at least a portion of the uptick 
we document reflects an increase in the underlying level of criminal behavior. And given the 
features of the federal enforcement regime that we observe—the disappearance of individual 
liability for guilty bankers, the low number of prosecutions against financial institutions—our 
results are unlikely to strike many as surprising.  
 
We recognize, however, that the most that we can say about these data is that they are 
consistent with a theory that financial crime is on the rise.  To speak to the question of whether the 
federal enforcement regime is supplying adequate deterrence for all types of crime, we also 
examine levels of public company recidivism, relying on data provided by Brandon Garrett.  We 
define a corporate recidivist to be a public company that is prosecuted more than once between 
2001-2018. We normalize fines by three measures of firm size—assets, revenue, and headcount. 
And we document a steep rise in recidivism—i.e., the number of firms that are prosecuted more 
than once—during this time period, across companies in all industries.39   
 
We also observe some interesting characteristics of recidivist firm penalties. The average size 
of the first penalty imposed on a recidivist firm is large—about twice as high as the average size 
of the penalty for non-recidivist firms. However, when measured as a percentage of the firm’s 
assets or revenue, the first penalty much smaller—about forty times smaller. In other words, larger 
companies tend to be recidivists, and bear a much smaller fine relative to smaller non-recidivist 
 
37 See ANDREAS FUSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 857: DOES CFPB OVERSIGHT 
CRIMP CREDIT? (2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr857.pdf. 
38 See Mortgage Delinquency Rate Trends,  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
data-research/mortgage-performance-trends/mortgages-90-or-more-days-delinquent/. 
39 This is not driven by the fact that the time horizon grows as years pass, e.g. a firm committing a crime in 2002 has 
only one year of prior criminal history, versus a firm in 2018 has 17 years. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis, the share of crimes committed by a recidivist jumps from 7% in 2010 (averaging around 10 percent in the 
decade prior) to 28% in 2011 (averaging over 30 percent in the decade that follows). See infra Figure 11. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537245
 7 
institutions: these fines are closer to “parking tickets”40 than meaningful deterrents.41 For smaller 
firms, fines represent a larger burden.42 This may explain why their deterrent value (as measured 
by the likelihood of offending again) is higher than the lower fees ascribed to their larger 
counterparts. Perversely, concern about the potential adverse effects of criminal prosecution on 
large firms and the ramifications for the broader economy may insulate malfeasance that is most 
socially disruptive from liability.43  
 
In sum, our data indicate that financial misconduct is on the rise. We also document an increase 
in corporate recidivism across all types of crime.  And we suspect that the current U.S. financial 
enforcement regime is to blame.44 Although high fines imposed sporadically could result in 
efficient and adequate deterrence,45 our results indicate that fines are too low or too sporadic to 
effectively deter crime.46 We posit that the law and economics scholars who championed entity-
level liability and large financial penalties as the most efficient means of securing deterrence 
neglected the practical realities of enforcement: in theory, a large fine will cause the people at the 
 
40 Becker, supra note 19. 
41 See PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 124-25 (1980) (“The $437,500 fine imposed against General Electric 
in the electrical equipment conspiracy was said to be the equivalent of a parking fine for many citizens….Chevron 
paid $1 million fine in 1972 for violation of offshore antipollution laws…the fine was about .03 percent of the 
company’s gross income (about the same as a $10 traffic ticket for a person making $25,000 a year).”). Of course, 
another explanation is possible—perhaps larger companies are more likely to be pursued by the government. We 
observe, however, that recidivists are not more likely to have a corporate monitor or audit requirement imposed by 
the government in the first enforcement action. This indicates that our results are not explained by the ease of 
prosecution, although it does not rule out the hypothesis that enforcement agencies prefer to target larger companies 
for multiple rounds of enforcement actions.  
42 Note that this is the opposite of the approach taken by countries in Scandanavia, which scale up fines for certain 
crimes based on the offender’s income. See Joe Pinsker, Finland, Home of the $103,000 Speeding Ticket, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/finland-home-of-the-103000-
speeding-ticket/387484/. 
43 See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 6, 2013) (transcript 
available at: http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_45/transcript-attorney-general-eric-holder-ontoo-big-to-
jail-1057295-1.html) (“acknowledg[ing] that decades of deregulation and mergers had left the U.S. economy heavily 
consolidated” and that it was therefore “difficult to prosecute the major banks, because indictments could have a 
negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”).   
44 Financial institutions in the United States are heavily regulated, and their regulatory burden increased in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. This scrutiny restricts entry into financial markets, when in many cases new 
institutions must receive authorization before even beginning to serve consumers;  to their day-to-day operations, 
which are scrutinized by a labyrinth of distinct regulatory bodies who force adjustments to institutions’ capital 
structure in response to their individual health as well as overall market conditions. Despite the substantial increase 
in regulation in the financial series broadly; the regulation of financial misconduct, facilitated by the criminal justice 
system, has not been similarly overhauled. See, e.g., CARLOS M. PELÁEZ, ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER 
THE GLOBAL RECESSION (Springer, 2009). 
45 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1206 (1985) [hereinafter 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law] (“If the costs of collecting fines are assumed to be zero regardless of 
the size of the fine, the most efficient combination is a probability arbitrarily close to zero and a fine arbitrarily close 
to infinity.”). 
46 We are aligned with Judge Rakoff, who makes the point forcefully and repeatedly that fines levied against large 
financial institutions insufficiently deter their breaking the law. See Jed S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred Is Justice 
Denied, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Rakoff, Justice Denied], https://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2015/02/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied/; Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level 
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level 
Executives Been Prosecuted?], http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial -crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/.  
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top to take steps to prevent future instances of harm across the entity. But the size of the fine 
necessary to lead to adequate deterrence might not be possible to calculate (What is the social cost 
of eighty-six lives?) or politically feasible. (What if the optimal fine puts the firm into 
bankruptcy?47 What if the optimal fine for a large company is many billions of dollars?) 
 
Not only that, there are practical limitations to the corporation’s ability to adequately deter 
future incidents of crime.48 That is because there is a disconnect between the recipient of the 
punishment and the bad actor when the only punishment is an entity-level fine. Quite obviously, 
an entity-level fine primarily affects shareholders, not necessarily the individuals who committed 
the crime. In theory, shareholders should have an incentive to take steps aimed at deterring future 
bad activity, but rationally apathetic shareholders might not recognize the problem nor understand 
how to address it. In addition, the ultimate deterrent effect of fines against corporations and their 
shareholders may be muted by several factors. For example, although a company’s stock price 
falls after the imposition of the penalty, it usually bounces back very quickly.49 Shareholders might 
not demand an appropriate reduction in activity levels, nor the right amount of firm-wide 
monitoring, to avoid future instances of crime.50  
 
In sum, we theorize that an over-reliance on entity-level fines is likely inadequate from a 
deterrence perspective. Even though the average fine is higher today than ever before, fines are 
still too low to make up for uneven enforcement. The optimal entity-level penalty is likely to be 
very large and potentially infinite—well outside the possibility set of those negotiating these 
settlements. Even if enforcers could levy the optimal fine, the effect would be muted—dispersed 
shareholders would bear the brunt of the harm, but collective action problems limit their ability to 
take action to discipline wayward management. In other words, the managers who agree to pay 
fines out of shareholders’ pockets might not bear any consequences.51  
 
Our article therefore makes two primary contributions. First, we proxy for financial crime 
using three novel data sources with the goal of assessing whether criminal enforcement is 
adequately deterring financial crime. Importantly, we are the only paper to look beyond 
enforcement data—which is subject to endogeneity concerns—when evaluating criminal 
 
47 See Larry Summers, Companies on Trial: Are They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/e3bf9954-7009-11e4-90af-00144feabdc0 (noting the collateral consequences that occur 
when corporations are punished, including harm to innocent employees and shareholders, and observing that these 
consequences have affected enforcement policy).  
48 Shavell and Polinsky provide the classic view, that “if firms are made strictly liable for their harms, they will 
design rewards and punishments for their employees that will lead employees to reduce the risk of harm, since firms 
will want to reduce their liability payments.” A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees be Subject 
to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L J.L. & ECON. 239, 241 (1993) 
[hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Should Employees be Subject to Fines?].  
49 Matthews, others. 
50 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).  
51 See Summers, supra note 47 (“The current trend towards large fines as the response to corporate wrongdoing 
seems to promote a somewhat unattractive combination of individual incentives. Managers do not find it personally 
costly to part with even billions of dollars of their shareholders’ money, especially when fines represent only a small 
fraction of total market value. Paying with shareholders’ money as the price of protecting themselves is a very 
attractive trade-off. Enforcement authorities like to either collect large fines or be seen as delivering compensation 
for those who have been victimised by corporate wrongdoing. So they are all too happy to go along.”).  
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enforcement. And we generate several pieces of evidence indicating that enforcement is not 
adequately deterring financial crime. Second, we identify serious flaws in the law and economics 
theory that enforcement agencies have embraced, as well as its practical administration, that could 
contribute to underdeterrence. 
 
We recognize, however, that our data do not allow us to precisely identify the aspects of our 
enforcement regime that are failing us, nor the appropriate course of action to correct it. Therefore, 
our principal policy recommendation is for the government to abandon law and economics theory 
as a guide. We postulate that the deterrence value of individual penalties for corporate malfeasance 
is likely significantly larger than entity-level liability that theory recommends—and the current 
enforcement regime adopts. This is ultimately an empirical question, and so we urge government 
to adopt a data-driven approach to enforcement. With better data, government policymakers would 
be better able to understand how to calibrate enforcement to deter corporate misconduct. For 
example, most enforcement actions are brought against small, closely held companies (which, 
unfortunately, are beyond the scope of the enforcement dataset collected by Brandon Garrett).52 
Perhaps this is because small companies are more likely to commit crimes; or, they could be 
equally or even less likely to commit crimes, and yet agencies target them because small companies 
are easier to prosecute or because there are more of them.  (To continue the analogy from above, 
if the government only arrests and prosecutes small-time criminals, crime in other areas will not 
be effectively deterred). If we could observe that crime has been increasing among large companies 
in the wake of shift in enforcement, we would be able to offer a tailored recommendation—
enforcement agencies should focus attention on prosecuting crime at larger companies, either by 
increasing the number of prosecutions, levying higher penalties, or by targeting guilty individuals. 
And if enforcement agencies moved in this direction, we could then study the effect on crime 
levels over time. Instead, enforcement agency performance is typically assessed by counting the 
number of enforcement actions, rather than by evaluating their quality.53  In sum, better data would 
help researchers and the government alike establish whether our enforcement regime is adequately 
deterring crime. 
 
However, if our results are confirmed with further study, the normative implications seem to 
be clear. To increase deterrence, enforcement agencies should consider increasing the number of 
enforcement actions that are brought or pursuing culpable individuals. If it is currently too difficult 
and expensive for agencies to prosecute individuals, proposals like Senator Warren’s, which aim 
to make it easier for agencies to pursue guilty individuals, provide a solution. 54 We explore other 
policy options for enforcement agencies and lawmakers in Part IV. 
 
 
52 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: ORGANIZATIONAL OFFENDERS 1 (2018),  https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Organizational-Offenders_FY18.pdf (noting that 62.5% 
of organizational offenders were closely-held or private corporations, while only 7.5% of organizational offenders 
were publicly traded). 
53 This can lead to perverse consequences. Cf. Testimony of Dr. Shelley H. Metzenbaum before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, 
Hearings on EPA and State Enforcement of Water Laws (Oct. 14, 2003) (“Even when enforcement targets are not 
formally established, agency staff tend to assume they must meet or exceed the previous year’s enforcement levels. 
This can create a pressure to find enforcement practices just to meet a target . . .”).  
54 See Anello, supra note 14.  
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Our paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes the current enforcement regime in detail, as 
well as its origins in law and economics theory. Part III describes our data and results, which 
indicate that financial crime is on the rise and supplies a possible cause—an overreliance on fines 
as the primary form of punishment. Part IV identifies flaws in the law and economics literature 
that has guided enforcement as a possible cause of the underdeterrence we identify. It also 
discusses implications for lawmakers. In particular, the government should adopt a data-driven 
approach to enforcement, in light of theoretical flaws we identify. In addition, if it is not possible 
to calculate optimal entity-level fines as theory would prescribe, enforcement agencies should 
consider other ways of deterring crime, such as by pursuing penalties against individuals. It also 
supplies recommendations to guide future research in this area. Part V concludes.    
   
II. Corporate Criminal Enforcement: Theory and Practice 
 
In the United States, corporations can be held criminally liable for crimes committed by agents 
in the scope of employment through the doctrine of respondeat superior.”55 When we discuss 
“corporate crime,” we are referring to crimes committed by corporate agents that could be 
attributed to the entity under this doctrine.  If convicted of a crime, the corporate entity can be 
subject to a wide range of penalties, including fines, restitution, community service, and a loss of 
charter (of course, the guilty agents can also be subject to liability).56  
 
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker famously developed an “economic approach” to criminal 
punishment.57 His main thesis, which has guided decades of future work in criminal law, is that 
the optimal level of criminal enforcement requires trading off the benefits to society from 
punishing and deterring crime against the costs of catching and punishing offenders. In his baseline 
model, the costs of different punishments to the offender are compared by “converting them into 
their monetary equivalent or worth.”58 For dollar penalties, these costs are of course readily 
observable. For penalties like prison sentences, “costs” in the Beckerian framework include 
foregone earnings and foregone consumption.59 Because the social cost of punishment is the total 
cost to offenders plus the cost or (minus the gain) to others, fines are preferable to prison stays of 
the same “cost,” because the social cost of fines is about zero. Roughly stated, the theory makes a 
case for punishment by “optimal fine,” and argues that goal of the legal system is to levy fines 
equal to the harm inflicted on society by constraints on trade.  
 
In the decades that followed, Becker’s basic claim—that crime can and should be punished by 
optimal fines—permeated corporate criminal law scholarship. In addition, a growing law and 
economics literature studying corporate crime viewed entity-liability with a skeptical eye. For 
example, commentators voiced concerns that criminal liability may overdeter beneficial corporate 
activity or have other harmful effects, such as higher consumer prices—especially in light of the 
 
55 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1489 (1996). 
56 See id. at 1529. Of course, criminal prosecutions are not the only way to encourage socially beneficial corporate 
behavior. New regulations and compliance systems to enforce them can help address problems like financial 
misconduct, workplace sexual harassment, etc. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the efficacy of these 
ex-ante compliance management systems is limited. See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance 
Management Systems, Cambridge Handbook of Compliance, forthcoming. 
57 See Becker, supra note 19. 
58 Id. at 170. 
59 Id.  
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fact that criminal liability is often imposed alongside civil liability.60 Therefore, in determining 
how to set an optimal level of corporate criminal enforcement from a deterrence perspective, law 
and economics scholars offered the following guideposts. 
 
First, the optimal amount of corporate crime is unlikely to be zero. A corporation is a nexus of 
contracts between individuals, some of whom may break the law without the awareness of other 
employees.61 In this respect, it seems strange to penalize the entity for the crime of an agent. 
However, entity liability can be useful if it induces the company to monitor employees and prevent 
future incidents of crime.62 However, it may be expensive for the company to invest resources in 
preventing all future incidents of crime, and the cost could exceed the benefit. Ideally, a company 
would only invest in monitoring up to the point that the marginal cost of monitoring equals the 
marginal social gain (i.e., the reduction in social harm from crime by corporate agents).63 
 
In general, an optimal enforcement regime would follow Becker’s analysis and set the criminal 
penalty equal to the social cost of the crime, which equals the sum of the cost of the harm from 
crime as well as the cost of its prevention (more on this latter point in the next paragraph), adjusted 
for the probability of detection.64 Calibrating the penalty in this way would induce the corporation 
to spend the socially optimal amount on prevention efforts because the corporation’s private gains 
from monitoring will equal the social gains. For example, if a corporation’s criminal activity has 
a social cost of $100 million, but it expects that it will be required to pay a fine of $50 million if it 
is caught. Quite obviously, the company will pay too little on prevention efforts and engage in a 
suboptimal level of crime. Setting the penalty at $100 million will induce the company to pay the 
right amount to avoid future incidence of crime.   
 
Second and relatedly, the social cost of the crime includes not just costs to victims, but also 
costs to the criminal justice system itself. From that insight comes the following practical guidance: 
enforcement agencies can help alleviate costs associated with crime by considering the expense of 
different methods of imposing deterrence. Relatedly, agencies face limited budgetary resources, 
which means that spending government money on one enforcement action precludes spending 
money elsewhere. Agencies can therefore maximize their limited budgets by minimizing the costs 
associated with each enforcement action.65 For example, why take a company to trial—a costly 
 
60 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability 
of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1992) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Enforcement Costs]; Fischel & Sykes, supra 
note 21, at 321 (noting that the combination of both civil and criminal liability often results in “overdeterrence ex 
ante, and an excessive investment of resources in litigation ex post.”).  
61 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (describing organizations as “legal fictions which serve as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”). 
62 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 700 (observing that “entity liability is justified if it induces the firm to 
sanction wrongdoing more cheaply than the government can”); Becker, supra note 19, at 190-93; see also Fischel & 
Sykes, supra note 21, at 324 (“It is plainly undesirable for firms to invest infinite resources to prevent their agents’ 
parties from committing crimes, even if those crimes themselves are clearly unproductive.”). 
63 Fischel & Sykes, supra note 21, at 324 (“[M]onitoring is desirable . . . up to the point at which its marginal cost 
would exceed the marginal social gain in the form of reduced social harm from criminal activity.”]   
64 Id.  
65 Cf. Dorothy Shapiro, Lessons from SEC v. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope for Judicial Review of Agency Consent 
Decrees, 64 MICH ST. J. BUS. & SEC. L. 63 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246033. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537245
 12 
and burdensome process—when the agency could instead secure a massive fine in a settlement?66 
Why charge individuals—which is expensive, and sure to result in a lengthy fight, when it is 
possible to charge the entity instead?67 Why send an individual to prison, which burdens the state, 
when it is possible charge an entity-level fine that will generate revenue and also induce the 
company to invest in deterrence?68 And why pursue every incidence of misconduct when it is 
possible to simply ratchet up the penalty to compensate for the decreased likelihood of detection 
and punishment?69 In sum, accounting for regulatory burdens often cautions in favor of pursuing 
entity liability rather than individual liability, settling cases rather than taking them to trial, and 
pursuing blockbuster fines against a few bad actors rather than attempting to catch and punish 
every criminal act.  
 
Third, law and economics scholars have offered additional guidance about when entity 
liability would be preferable to individual liability from the perspective of shareholders, as well 
as society at large. Because individual managers are less suited to bearing risk than diversified 
shareholders, shareholders might prefer entity-level liability to individual liability.70 Indeed, if 
managers were subject to criminal liability, that might make them extremely risk averse and 
require them to demand a risk premium (increasing costs for shareholders), or else forgo risky 
but beneficial projects.71 Relatedly, whenever individuals are judgment proof, they might not be 
induced to exercise socially optimal levels of care via fines—the only option to secure adequate 
deterrence would be something more, like jail time, which again, imposes far greater social 
costs.72 By contrast, the entity is much more likely to be able to bear the high fine necessary to 
achieve optimal deterrence. A final reason to prefer entity liability over individual liability is that 
corporations may be the most cost-effective providers of prevention and policing. When that is 
 
66 See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59 (1982) (noting that willingness to go to trial 
“depends on an ex ante evaluation of the chance of prevailing, on the probable magnitude of a judgment, and on the 
legal costs of going to trial and the method by which they are to be allocated.”); Posner, An Economic Theory of 
Criminal Law, supra note 45; see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement 
Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 17–31 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996) 
(noting the efficiency gains from settlement versus trial in the case of corporations). 
67 Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, supra note 45; Kobayashi, supra note 66; JESSE EISINGER, THE 
CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (Simon & Schuster, 2017) 
[hereinafter EISINGER, CHICKENSHIT CLUB]. 
68 Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, supra note 45, at 1206-07 (“For while the costs of apprehending 
and convicting criminals rise with the probability of apprehension . . . the costs of collecting fines are by assumption 
zero regardless of their size.”). 
69 Polinsky & Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines?, supra note 48. 
70 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J 857, 866-67 
(1984) (arguing that “enterprise liability is the normal form of corporate liability in the prescriptive as well as the 
descriptive sense” since it “induces compliance without complicating the manager-shareholder contract or disturbing 
the advantageous intra-firm allocation of business risk.”). However, if managers are insured or indemnified, same 
risk sharing benefit is achieved. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 21, at 1245. 
71 Kraakman, supra note 70, at 865 (“As undiversified risk bearers who gamble all their personal assets, uninsured 
managers will of course demand a very large risk premium if they are simply paid outright for enduring even a small 
probability of catastrophic personal liability.”); see Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of 
Corporations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 322 (1991) (discussing “excessive risk-aversion by corporate actors” as one of 
the ways in which agency costs manifest).  
72 Polinsky & Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines?, supra note 48. 
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the case, the state should primarily focus on inducing firms to undertake the right level of 
prevention measures.73 
 
In sum, the law and economics literature has traditionally embraced Becker’s framework, and 
in so doing, theorized that enforcement agencies should utilize high fines over imprisonment, 
sporadic enforcement and settlement over consistent enforcement and full trials, and entity liability 
and compliance reform over individual liability. Each of these precepts would minimize 
enforcement costs without sacrificing deterrence, so long as fines equal the social cost of the crime 
adjusted upward for the probability of detection. In addition, the literature has begun from the 
premise that a central concern in calibrating an enforcement regime is minimizing the risk of 
overdeterrence. Again, the optimal amount of crime is unlikely to be zero, and so aggressive 
criminal enforcement (coupled with civil liability) could induce expensive compliance efforts and 
chill beneficial corporate activity, harming company competitiveness and raising consumer prices. 
 
Overall, these precepts have influenced enforcement agency practice in four main ways. In the 
past few decades, enforcement agencies have brought fewer corporate prosecutions, increased the 
number of settlements, brought fewer actions against individuals, and sought higher and higher 
fines.74 First, corporate prosecutions and convictions have been steadily falling. For example, the 
number of corporate prosecutions filed by the Department of Justice fell 29% between from 2004 
and 2014.75 This trend has continued since then, and in 2018, the number of corporate convictions 
fell to 99, breaking a record for the lowest number ever recorded.76   
 
Second, although the number of prosecutions has declined, the number of settlements has 
increased—especially among the largest companies.77 From 2006 to 2019, for example, only 
twelve corporations were convicted after a trial. Traditionally, the DOJ would settle cases with 
companies using a plea agreement, after charges were filed in court.78 Today, an increasing share 
of corporate criminal enforcement actions are settled without a plea, using non-prosecution 
agreements or “NPAs” and deferred prosecution agreements or “DPAs.”79 The use of these 
 
73 Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 23, at 165 (“Firms subject to [strict corporate] liability will adopt 
the prevention measures that minimize both their expected costs and total social costs.”). 
74 Note that this article focuses on enforcement at the federal level, where “the most significant and complex [] cases 
have long been brought.” See Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 1).  
75 TRANSACT’L RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DATA REVEAL 29 PERCENT DROP IN 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CORPORATIONS (2015), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/; see also Garrett, 
Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 12-14). 
76 RICK CLAYPOOL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, SOFT ON CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ REFUSES TO PROSECUTE CORPORATE 
LAWBREAKERS, FAILS TO DETER REPEAT OFFENDERS 9 (2019) [hereinafter CLAYPOOL, SOFT ON CORPORATE 
CRIME], https://www.citizen.org/article/soft-on-corporate-crime-deferred-and-non-prosecution-repeat-offender-
report/. 
77 See id. at 15 (arguing that the largest companies are treated most leniently and contending that this is the result of 
the Thompson Memo, which directed prosecutors to consider “potential adverse effects on a corporation’s 
shareholders and employees when deciding whether to bring charges against a corporation.”).  
78 See Kobayashi, supra note 66 (noting the efficiency gains from settlement versus trial in the case of corporations). 
79 The main difference between NPAs and DPAs is that DPAs require charges to be filed in court—the prosecutor 
agrees to defer the prosecution of charges during a predefined time period. By contrast, NPAs are not required to be 
filed in court, and therefore, the judge does not approve the terms of the settlement. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 16, 
at 332-33. For a critique of settling cases using these tools, see Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: 
Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191 (2016) 
[hereinafter Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law]. Note that the rise in DPAs and NPAs has also 
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settlements reached a high point of 102 in 2015 (which represented approximately a ten-fold 
increase from 2005).80 That number has since fallen off somewhat, but the percentage of corporate 
crime cases that are settled remains much higher than early-2000s levels. Put somewhat differently, 
the share of DPAs and NPAs brought against corporations out of the total number of prosecutions 
has been steadily rising over the past two decades, with a sharp spike in 2015.81 Relatedly, the 
number of corporate declinations, where the DOJ determines that a case has merit but is not 
pursued because of the company’s “voluntary disclosure, full cooperation, remediation, and 
payment of disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution,”82 are rising for FCPA cases.83 This type 
of settlement is especially lenient for defendants, as the government essentially determines that it 
will not take on a case that it thinks has merit.84 
 
Figure 1: Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements (Share of Total Prosecutions)85  
 
 
 
corresponded with an increase in imposition of a corporate monitor, which helps ensure compliance at the firm 
going forward. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate 
Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1740-42 (2007) [hereinafter Khanna, The Corporate Monitor]. 
80  The DOJ almost never settles charges against individuals using a DPA or NPA. See CLAYPOOL, SOFT ON 
CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 76, at 11 (showing that less than 1% of individuals receive “pre-trial diversions from 
federal prosecutors”).  
81 As Garrett explains, “the main reason [for the 2015 increase] is the large number of non-prosecution agreements 
entered in 2015 with Swiss Banks as part of a program to offer lenient settlements as part of self-reporting and 
cooperation. None of those cases involved individual charges filed, including for practical and jurisdictional reasons; 
the banks tended to be small or midsized Swiss banks (albeit ones providing tax shelters to U.S. taxpayers).” Garrett, 
Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 24). 
82 Id. (manuscript at 10). 
83 Id. (manuscript at 10-11). 
84 Id. (manuscript at 12). 
85 Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 28.  
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Third, individuals are only rarely charged when charges are settled via DPA and NPA. In a 
study of DPAs and NPAs entered into from 2001 to 2014, Brandon Garrett found that only 34% 
had officers or individuals prosecuted.86 Even in the wake of the Yates memo which admonished 
enforcement agencies to pursue individuals more often,87 not much changed—“if anything, 
individual charging [] declined in the years since [the memo] was adopted.”88 Moreover, even 
when individuals are charged, they are more likely than not to get off without jail time: Of the 
414 individuals prosecuted from 2001 to 2014, only 42% received any jail time.89 Since then, the 
Trump administration has amended the Yates memo to emphasize that investigations should not 
be delayed “merely to collect information about individuals whose involvement was not 
substantial, and who are not likely to be prosecuted.”90  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2015) [hereinafter 
Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat]. Most were low-level employees. Id. However, individual employees can 
be implicated in wrongdoing in the settlement documents. And these admissions can lead to reputational harm and 
expose the individuals to follow-on civil suits.  See Asaf Ekshtein & Gideon Parchomovsky. The Reverse Agency 
Problem in the Age of Compliance (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-38, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3460064. Gaining a better understanding of these harmful 
results will important for calibrating deterrence going forward. 
87 Memorandum from Sally Yates, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys. 1, 2 (Sept. 9, 2015) (available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download) (advising attorneys to focus on individuals in criminal 
and civil investigations, since “[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking 
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”). 
88 Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 24). 
89 Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 86, at 1792.   
90 Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the American Conference Institute's 35th 
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Rosenstein Remarks] 
(transcript available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-american-conference-institute-0; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-28.210 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual.  
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Figure 2: DPAs and NPAs with Corresponding Individual Suits (Share of Total) 91 
 
 
 
 
Fourth and finally, although individual punishment has declined, entity-level fines have 
steadily increased over the past two decades, only falling off to return to pre-crisis levels in 2018. 
This reversal in a decades-long trend toward increased fines is reflective of a skeptical DOJ attitude 
toward large financial penalties. In 2018, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein stated 
that corporate prosecutions should “avoid imposing penalties that disproportionately punish 
innocent employees, shareholders, customers and other stakeholders.”92 In a separate speech, he 
described a new policy that would help enforcement agencies avoid “piling on” that occurs when 
multiple regulators impose fines involving the same conduct, again, out of a concern for “innocent 
employees, customers, and investors.”93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 28. 2015 shows a slight increase from the previous years, but 
we view this as an anomalous year, because this is the year where the DOJ rolled out its Swiss Bank Program 
targeting banks that sheltered U.S. income. That program allowed banks to secure NPAs in exchange for disclosure 
of information relating to those accounts, which accounts for both the increase of individual prosecutions as well as 
the record-breaking total of DPAs and NPAs in that year. WHITE COLLAR DEFENSE & INVESTIGATIONS PRACTICE 
GROUP, GIBSON DUNN, 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE ON CORPORATE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (NPAS) AND 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) (2015) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN UPDATE], 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2015-mid-year-update-on-corporate-non-prosecution-agreements-npas-and-deferred-
prosecution-agreements-dpas/. 
92 Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 90; see Ben Protess, et al., Corporate Wrongdoers Get Break Under Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2018, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html. 
93 Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 90.  
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Figure 3: Aggregate Annual Corporate Criminal Penalties for all Prosecutions (Billions of 
Dollars)94  
 
 
 
 
In sum, law and economics scholars have much to like about how the current federal 
enforcement regime has developed in the past two decades. The DOJ has generally forgone 
individual liability in favor of entity-liability, favored settlements over trials, and until 2018, 
sought higher and higher fines to compensate for the reduced number of prosecutions.  
 
And if we look at the subset of prosecutions that involve banks, these trends are even 
starker. Before the financial crisis, banks were only rarely prosecuted. That changed in the wake 
of the financial crisis, where the DOJ secured a record-breaking amount of fines against financial 
institutions.95 Indeed, nearly $7 billion of the total $9 billion paid in corporate penalties in 2015 
came from financial institutions.96 But these fines are composed of a handful of blockbuster 
cases—the overall number of prosecutions has generally remained steady in the past few years, 
 
94 Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 28. Note that the penalty amount is the total of fines paid to 
the U.S. government, and does not include amounts paid to settle investor lawsuits or to foreign governments.   
95 We borrow Brandon Garrett’s definition for financial institutions, which include “a range of types of companies 
that focus on financial transactions, including commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and 
brokerages.” Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 86, at 1816.  
96 Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 24). Most of these bank settlements were 
part of a “Swiss Bank Program,” which targeted banks marketing illegal tax shelters. This program provided 
incentives for banks who disclosed the names of tax evaders in the U.S. See Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program. This program has since been winding down. Garrett, 
Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 24).  
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and it has fallen since 2017.97 In addition, the vast majority of fines were secured via settlement, 
rather than after trial and conviction.98 
 
Figure 4. Financial Institution Penalties, 2001-201899 
  
 
 
In addition, when banks are pursued, individual bankers are rarely charged. As Judge Jed 
Rakoff complained, as of 2014, no high-level executives had been successfully prosecuted in 
connection with the financial crisis.100 From 2001-2014, of the 66 DPAs and NPAs entered into 
with financial institutions, only 23 cases, or 35%, featured individual prosecutions.101  Most of 
these involved low-level employees.102 For certain types of financial institution crime, there is a 
 
97 Id. (manuscript at 12) (“As noted, in the last 18 months of the Obama Administration, 65 financial institutions 
were prosecuted, while during the first 18 months of the Trump Administration, 13 financial institutions were 
prosecuted.”); see also M. KENDALL DAY ET AL., GIBSON DUNN, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEFENSE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2019) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN DEVELOPMENTS], https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/developments-in-defense-of-financial-institutions-jan-2019.pdf. 
98 GIBSON DUNN DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at apps. 
99 Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 12-13 fig. 2). 
100 Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 44. 
101 Those cases involved deferred and non-prosecution agreements with Baystar Capital Management LLC (fraud); 
ConvergEx Group, LLC (securities fraud); Deutsche Bank AG (tax fraud); Diamondback Capital Management LLC 
(securities fraud); GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (FCPA); German Bank HVB (tax fraud); Jefferies 
Group LLC (fraud); JPMorgan Chase & Co. (antitrust); Louis Berger Group (fraud); Mellon Bank, N.A. (theft); 
Merrill Lynch (false statements); Mirant Energy Trading (false commodities reporting); NETeller PLC (illegal 
gambling); Omega Advisors (FCPA); Prudential Equity Group (securities fraud); Rabobank (wire fraud); and UBS 
AG (three separate cases involving tax fraud, antitrust, and wire fraud). See Garrett, Corporate Criminal as 
Scapegoat, supra note 86, at 1816 n.110. 
102 Garrett, Declining Bank Prosecutions, supra note 15, at 23. 
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complete dearth of individual prosecution. As an example, no individual employees or officers 
were prosecuted in cases involving alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, which proscribes 
money laundering.103 
 
In theory, these enforcement practices could be consistent with an optimal deterrence regime. 
Again, so long as fines are equal to the social cost of crime multiplied by the probability of 
detection, we should expect that companies will spend the right amount of money to prevent 
future wrongdoing.  However, this is not how fines are calculated.104 The sentencing guidelines 
instead require the organization to remedy harm. The guidelines then set the fine range based on 
“the seriousness of the offense” (reflected by the amount of pecuniary loss), as well as the 
corporation’s “culpability.”  Organizational culpability is based on, “(i) the involvement in or 
tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an 
order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice.”105 The guidelines also allow penalty mitigation 
whenever the company has “an effective compliance program” or cooperates with authorities.106 
In other words, the sentencing guidelines scale penalties upwards based not on the probability of 
non-detection, but instead on culpability; penalties are adjusted downwards as a reward for 
cooperation.107  
 
Without an effort to calculate fines in a way that is optimal, the federal enforcement regime 
might not be deterring crime sufficiently. Indeed, it is probably not possible for the state to 
estimate the marginal cost of corporate crime.108 Then how can we know whether our 
enforcement system is adequately deterring corporate crime?   
 
The answer to this question is subject to much debate. On the one hand, many politicians,109 
judges,110 academics,111 and journalists112 are skeptical that our current enforcement regime is 
 
103 Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 86, at 1816. As Federal District Judge Emmett G. Sullivan 
stated when considering a DPA against Barclays bank for Bank Secrecy Act violations: “No one goes to jail, no one 
is indicted, no individuals are mentioned as far as I can determine . . . there’s no personal responsibility.” Id. at 
1817. Other public officials have complained about the lack of individual charges in money laundering cases. Id.  
104 See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 23, at 189 (“Nevertheless, current practice does not fit all the 
requirements of an optimal corporate liability system in that federal authorities have not adopted clear guidelines to 
ensure that civil regulators and the DOJ impose optimal residual sanctions on firms – sanctions that take full account 
of the variety of ways in which firms bear the social costs of crime.”). 
105 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 23, introductory cmt. 
106 Id. For a critique of this mitigation system, see Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321 (2012) [hereinafter Arlen, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines]. 
107 Of course, as the previous section made clear, most fines are imposed not by courts, but by agencies pursuant to a 
settlement. However, most settlements provide a guidelines-informed fine range, indicating that the guidelines are 
affecting the determination of the fine size. ALEXANDER, TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, supra note 27, 
at 38-41. This same study found that the base guideline fine was higher for DPAs and NPAs, but there was also 
much more variability across crimes that were the subject of DPAs and NPAs. Id. at 39 ($189 million and $219 
million for DPAs and NPAs, respectively, as compared to the $75.7 million for pleas at the mean).  
108 Cf. Baumol & Oates, supra note 25.  
109 See, e.g., Corporate Executive Accountability Act, S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019) (as referred to the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1010/text). 
110 See, e.g., Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 44. 
111 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 
(2014); Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 471 (2018); Garrett, 
Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15; Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 86. 
112 See, e.g., EISINGER, CHICKENSHIT CLUB, supra note 67. 
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supplying adequate deterrence. For example, Judge Jed Rakoff has been a vocal critic of 
prosecutorial efforts in the wake of the financial crisis. He contrasted the DOJ’s decision to not 
prosecute any high-level individuals with the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, after which 
hundreds of individuals were prosecuted.113 Likewise, politicians have sought reforms that would 
make it easier to prosecute bankers. In 2018, for example, Senator Warren introduced the “Ending 
Too Big to Jail Act,” which would require officers of any bank with more than $10 billion in assets 
to certify every year that they have not uncovered any criminal or civil misconduct.114 Any 
executive who “willfully” files a false certification, would be eligible for jail time.115 The DOJ 
under the Trump Administration has taken the opposite view and adopted policies that further relax 
penalties as a reward for compliance,116 decrease the likelihood of individual prosecutions,117 and 
limit the size of fines and other penalties in favor of securing “reasonable and proportionate 
outcomes in major corporate investigations.”118  
 
In order to resolve this debate, it would be helpful to know whether our enforcement is 
adequately deterring corporate crime. And this Article proposes that if it is not possible to 
accurately measure inputs, it may be possible to observe outputs. Put differently, the inability to 
calculate optimal fines might not matter as much if we could study trends in corporate activity 
over time, and calibrate fines and penalties based on that information. However, unlike every other 
type of criminal crime, there is no attempt by the government to estimate corporate crime levels.119 
Thanks to Brandon Garrett, we have ample data about corporate crime enforcement—the number 
of prosecutions, convictions, and settlements, as well as their terms.120 We can therefore accurately 
describe our enforcement regime and its shifting priorities. What we cannot tell is whether that 
regime is adequately deterring corporate crime. Therefore, in the next section, we take first steps 
toward estimating whether financial crime has been increasing or decreasing over time.  
 
III. Financial Crime on the Rise 
 
 In this section, we consider whether certain types of financial crime are rising or falling 
based on three distinct proxies for financial crime:  the database of Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) maintained by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at Treasury (FinCEN), a 
consumer complaints database maintained by the CFPB, and data provided by the SEC’s 
 
113 See Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 44; see also EISINGER, 
CHICKENSHIT CLUB, supra note 67. 
114 Peter J. Henning, Why Elizabeth Warren’s Effort to Hold Bank Executives Accountable May Fall Short, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/dealbook/elizabeth-warrens-bank-executives-
accountability.html. 
115 Id. 
116 CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download; see Geeja T. Gobena et al., United States: DOJ 
Refines Cooperation Requirements of FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, MONDAQ (Nov. 29, 2019),  
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/869458/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/DOJ+refines+cooperation+requiremen
ts+of+FCPA+corporate+enforcement+policy (discussing several changes to DOJ policy designed to account for 
“practical realities” of enforcement while also creating “flexibility for corporate actors”).  
117 See Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 15. 
118 Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 90. 
119 BJS White Collar Reports, supra note 27 (showing that the last estimate of white collar crime was in 1983).  
120 Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 28. 
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whistleblower program. We then study corporate recidivism, relying on enforcement data from 
Brandon Garrett. We address each dataset in turn. 
 
A. Suspicious Activity Reports  
 
SARs are an anonymous mechanism to report suspected money laundering and other financial 
crimes used by institutions subject to the Bank Secrecy Act.121 The intuition behind the SAR 
requirement is that financial institutions are best positioned to detect illegal use of the financial 
system; as such, they should be enlisted in helping the government root out financial crime.  
 
SARs are required to be filed whenever an employee or other individual122 suspects that an 
agent within the institution has attempted to perform a transaction in furtherance of money 
laundering and other financial crime.123 However, suspicious transactions below a $5,000 
threshold do not require a SAR report.124  The failure to comply with SAR filing requirements is 
punishable by criminal and civil penalties, including large fines, loss of the bank’s charter, and 
imprisonment.125 As a result, all financial institutions train employees on how to identify and flag 
suspicious activity.126  
 
SAR reports are confidential, meaning that the person that is the subject of the report is not 
told about it, nor is anyone outside of the institution privy to the information. Any unauthorized 
disclosure is punishable as a criminal offense. In addition, the SAR report filer need not disclose 
their name and are awarded immunity during the discovery process.127  
 
A SAR report describes the suspicious behavior, the crime categories to which the behavior 
pertains,128 and the agent’s relationship with the institution (e.g., customer, supplier, insider, etc.). 
After the institution receives a report, it must undertake a multi-stage review process, which 
ultimately entails sending it to the bank’s financial investigators, management, and attorneys.129 
Financial institutions are required to file SARs within 30 days after the detection of suspicious 
 
121 See Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bank-operations/financial-crime/suspicious-activity-
reports/index-suspicious-activity-reports.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter SARs].  
122 Individuals other than bank employees have duties to file SARs, including stockbrokers, insurance companies, 
and travel agencies. Steven Pelak, Putting the 'Enforcement' into the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 
HOLLAND & HART (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.hollandhart.com/putting-the-enforcement-into-the-financial-crimes-
enforcement-network. 
123 Id.  
124 A SAR must be filed if the transaction involves $5,000 or more and the covered institution or business knows, 
suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of transactions of which the transaction is a part) 
(1) involves illegal gains or an effort to evade federal law or regulation, (2) has no business or apparent lawful 
purpose or (3) is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage. Id.  
125 What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com
/en/insights/articles/what-is-a-suspicious-activity-report (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Filing categories have expanded over time, with a modest impact on the nature of reports filed. For example, in 
April 2013, FinCEN introduced an electronic SAR filing that includes “elder financial exploitation” as a category, 
and such filings tripled in the following years. This is why our focus is on filing categories that have been available 
since the beginning of our sample period.  
129 Id.  
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behavior at their institution.  Finalized SAR reports are sent to one of eight federal agencies—the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities Exchange Commission, the 
OCC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and the FHFA.130 When the alleged activity implicates financial 
crime, the SAR report may be sent to a fusion center, which makes the information available to 
state and federal agencies that may be interested in acting.131  
 
There have been a few important changes in SAR reporting requirements in the past few 
decades. Most important, in 2002, the USA Patriot Act made SAR reporting requirements 
mandatory for broker dealers who suspect any violation of law or regulation, therefore subjecting 
broker dealers to a broader requirement than financial institutions.132 Immediately following the 
enactment of the Patriot Act, there was a spike in SAR report filing, even by banks who were 
subject to the same requirements (an earlier analysis of SAR reports shows that the spike 
eventually tapered off around 2010, just before our analysis begins).133 A former Treasury official 
speculated that the acceleration in filing may have been the result of financial institution concern 
about reputational risk after 9/11.134 Since 2002, however, SAR reporting requirements have been 
relatively stable. 
 
We secured all available SAR enforcement data from the US Treasury Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network.135 The SAR data comprise both business-related and individual suspicious 
activity. To proxy for financial institution crime (rather than crimes that would not be attributed to 
the entity under respondeat superior), we isolate SARs referencing institutional insiders 
(employees, directors, agents, officers, and owning or controlling shareholders). The underlying 
data are reported monthly and exhibits a high degree of volatility; to aid with data visualization 
and interpretation, we perform one-sided winsoring at the 90% level and take a twelve-month 
moving average of the series.136  
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the increase in SARs filed across all eight agencies studied. We 
acknowledge that there is not a one-for-one relationship between SARs and underlying financial 
crime, however, we think that this data is a better proxy for violations than Bank Secrecy Act 
enforcement data.  Measures of criminal enforcement—such as arrests and prosecutions—are 
dependent on factors like the ability to detect criminal behavior, the availability of admissible 
evidence, and agency resources.  By contrast, bank employees are required to file SARs whenever 
they suspect that malfeasant behavior is occurring and therefore, the data collected is not subject 
to same endogeneity concern. Thus, while SARs may overstate the amount of crime (i.e., contain 
 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Bibb L. Strench et al., Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives Under the USA Patriot Act, FINDLAW, 
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/anti-money-laundering-initiatives-under-the-usa-patriot-act.html. 
133 Aaron Klein & Kristofer Readling, Acceleration in Suspicious Activity Reporting Warrants Another Look, 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/acceleration-in-suspicious-activity-
reporting-warrants-another-look/; FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (FINCEN), THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW – BY THE 
NUMBERS (2013) [hereinafter BTN], https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/sar_report/sar_by_numb_18.pdf. 
134 JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE (PublicAffairs, 
2013). 
135 Before 2012, SAR reports are not available electronically, and so we were not able to secure data before this date. 
136 Winsorizing the series excludes large outliers from the analysis, which can obfuscate trends. The use of a moving 
average also helps smooth the data series, as we analyze the observations by taking rolling means of twelve-month 
subsets of the full data series.   
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false positives) we doubt that they systematically and directionally err in reflecting the aggregate 
level of financial crime.  
 
Figure 5: SAR Counts by Agency 
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It is important to highlight that SAR filings are not exogenous to the enforcement environment. 
The data highlight this directly: the 2001 Patriot Act did not change the reporting requirements for 
banks but instead expanded them to other entities. Yet, even for banks, there was a substantial 
uptick in SAR reporting. This uptick may have resulted from increased concern about bank 
reputation, or increased SAR filing enforcement by regulators.  The uptick in reporting that we 
observe necessarily conflates both changes the level of criminal behavior and in the reporting of 
that behavior by financial institutions.  
 
Two facts help us draw implications on trends in levels of crime from the reports that we study, 
despite this endogeneity concern. First, unlike the lax enforcement of the early 2000s, during the 
entire period of our sample, FinCEN took SAR filing seriously. Before 2005, FinCEN had not 
consistently pursued enforcement actions for the failure to file SARs; that changed in 2005 after 
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the agency prosecuted Riggs Bank criminally for the willful failure to file SARs.137 Since that 
time, the agency has regularly brought enforcement actions against banks that fail to file SARs.138 
Second, although it is true that across agencies there has been a level shift upward in SAR 
reporting, it is not the case that these patterns are identical across agencies. Even within agency, 
trends in SAR filings differ across categories. In 2012, mortgage loan fraud reported by depository 
institutions decreased by 29 percent—after having risen each year since 1996. In that same year, 
banks saw increases in 12 of the 21 other suspicious activity categories.139 
 
A larger issue is that our results may be driven by heightened sensitivity from bank employees 
to the risk of enforcement following the financial crisis. In the wake of the financial crisis, banks 
were under intense scrutiny from regulators and politicians. This scrutiny would cause the rational 
bank employee to suspect that their behavior would be more likely to be subject to scrutiny by 
enforcement agencies. And this may lead to the rise in reporting (i.e., bank employees file SARs 
more frequently than they would have pre-crisis) that we observe. 
 
However, if that was the only cause of the rise in SAR reports, we would expect to see an 
immediate increase after the crisis. We would also expect to see a reversion back to pre-crisis 
levels as we get further from 2008. That is not what we observe.  In fact, in many categories, we 
do not see an uptick until 2014 (or later). Therefore, we do not believe that these trends are solely 
explained by concerns about the increased risk of enforcement. 
 
B. CFPB Consumer Complaint Database  
  
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB maintains a consumer complaint database that allows consumers 
to submit complaints about unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices by financial services 
companies.140 These complaints give the agency “insights into problems people are experiencing 
in the marketplace and help us regulate consumer financial products and services under existing 
federal consumer financial laws, enforce those laws judiciously, and educate and empower 
consumers to make informed financial decisions.”141 The CFPB also intends that the database will 
be used by researchers to use the data to identify harmful business practices that might harm 
consumers.142 The CFPB began accepting complaints regarding credit cards since its first day of 
operations in July 2011, and it has since expanded to several categories: mortgages, bank accounts 
 
137 Steven Pelak, Putting the 'Enforcement' into the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 122. 
138 Id.; Alan M. Wolper & Frances Floriano Goins, SEC Civil Penalty Against Charles Schwab Reflects New Trend 
in Enforcement of SAR Requirements, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=350d2cd9-e2c4-47b8-b091-c25998e1b8fb. 
139 SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW, supra note 133. It is again possible that the increase in enforcement that prompts extra 
SARs to be filed differs within each category. This seems less plausible, and certainly, in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis, it is hard to imagine a category where enforcement would be higher than for mortgage loan fraud at banks. 
140 Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 34.  
141 Consumer Complaint Entry, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
142 Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the Consumer Response Field Hearing 
(Mar. 28, 2013) (available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-director-
richard-cordray-at-the-consumer-response-field-hearing/); Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the Database: An Early 
Analysis of the CFPD’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 347 (2014). 
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and services, private student loans, vehicle loans, other consumer loans, credit reporting 
complaints, and money transfers.143   
 
After receiving a consumer complaint, the agency confirms that the consumer is actually a 
client of the financial institution in question, that the complaint has not been filed already, and that 
the complaint was submitted by the consumer. However, the agency does not take steps to verify 
whether the complaint has merit. Complaints are forwarded to the appropriate company and/or 
regulatory agency, and the company has an opportunity to respond.144 
 
The CFPB database is distinct from SAR filings because these are voluntary reports made by 
consumers who believe themselves to be victims of crimes, rather than banks who believe they 
may be facilitating crimes. Thus, the endogeneity concern detailed above—that the increase in 
SAR reporting reflects changes in the enforcement regime—is irrelevant in this context. Instead, 
with respect to the CFPB database, the competing explanations for the uptick in consumer 
complaints we document is: (1) the increases in reporting are driven by greater financial crime; 
and (2) the increases in reporting are driven by changes in consumers’ likelihood of reporting that 
are independent of the underlying level of malfeasance. There is an additional concern that 
consumers reports are not appropriate proxies for corporate crime levels, as consumers can report 
annoyances (e.g., the late fee charged by my credit card company is high) as well as crimes (e.g., 
fraud, embezzlement). Indeed, the database does not distinguish between “major” and “minor” 
complaints, nor does it verify the accuracy of each complaint lodged before making it publicly 
available.145  
 
However, analysis of the CFPB complaints data suggest that a non-trivial amount of these 
complaints track misbehavior to some extent. Although the majority of complaints are closed by 
companies with an explanation, 17 percent are closed with some type of relief, including 
“monetary relief” or “non-monetary relief,” the latter of which includes changing account terms, 
correcting submissions to a credit bureau, or coming up with a foreclosure alternative.146 Further, 
the anecdotal evidence supports the notion that there is relationship between the complaint 
database and financial crime. Between October 2016-December 2016, credit card complaints by 
customers of Wells Fargo increased by nearly 100 percent relative to the same period the year 
prior, an increase contemporaneous with its fake accounts scandal.147 
 
 
143 CFPD Website Homepage, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited Feb. 
12, 2020). 
144 Ayres, supra note 142, at 357. The company must respond within 15 days to be considered “timely.” Id.   
145 See id. There are several categories of complaints that range in severity. For example, for credit card issuers, they 
include: billing disputes, identity theft, closing/cancelling accounts, interest rates, late fees, customer service, 
marketing, delinquent accounts, and credit determination. Id. 
146 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Launches Consumer Complaint Database (June 19, 2012), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-consumer-
complaint-database/. Note that 97% of complaints receive a response from the financial service provider. Id.  
147 Ashlee Kieler, Complaints About Student Loan Servicing Increased 429% in Past Year, CONSUMERIST (last 
updated Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/complaints-about-student-loan-servicing-
increased-429-in-past-year/. 
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 Therefore, as with SARs, while we do not believe that there is a one-to-one correlation 
between the level of complaints filed and aggregate crime levels, we believe that they are a 
reasonable proxy for overall misconduct committed by consumer-facing financial institutions.148  
 
Figure 6: CFPB Resolved Complaints by Resolution Type (2014-2019) 
 
 
 
In Figure 7, we show the number of complaints by product type from January 2015 to July 
2019. Again, to aid in visualization and interpretation, we performed one-sided winsoring of the 
data at the 90% threshold level.149 These graphs reveal a steady increase in complaints by each 
product type, with the exception of mortgages.  
 
 
148 Federal law confers criminal jurisdiction over a variety of consumer financial protection matters, however, the 
CFPB lacks authority to bring criminal actions and is required to make criminal referrals to the Attorney General: 
“If the [CFPB] obtains evidence that any person, domestic or foreign, has engaged in conduct that may constitute a 
violation of Federal criminal law, the [CFPB] shall transmit such evidence to the Attorney General of the United 
States, who may institute criminal proceedings under appropriate law.” 12 U.S.C. § 5566. In furtherance of this goal, 
the DOJ and the CFPB have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that details their partnership. See 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Regarding 
Fair Lending Coordination (Dec. 6, 2012) (available at: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_doj-fair-
lending-mou.pdf); see also J.H. Jennifer Lee & John R. Marti, Consumer Protection, the CFPB, and Prison: 
How Jail Sentences Arose Out of Civil Consumer Financial Protection Matters, 31 ANTITRUST No. 3, Summer 
2017, at 21. (2017), https://www.dorsey.com/~/media/Files/Uploads/Images/Smmr17LeeC (describing the 
framework of the MoU which “addresses information sharing, joint investigations and coordination, and referrals 
and notifications between the agencies”). 
149 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 7: CFPB Complaints by Product Type 
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What to make of these results? It could be that the increase in complaints reflects consumer 
awareness of a new tool—the consumer complaint database—rather than a true increase in abusive 
or fraudulent practices by financial institutions. Although there certainly is some learning at play 
in the data, as evidenced by the large spike in the first two months of our dataset, we would expect 
uniform increases in complaint counts across all product types if this were the only operative effect. 
The steady decrease in mortgage complaints after 2016 suggests that the database may at least in 
part be picking up on something else.  
 
Why do we observe a decrease in mortgage complaints? Several possibilities exist. The fall in 
mortgage complaints is consistent with increased scrutiny from the federal government about 
mortgage practices in the years following the financial crisis, as new regulations and regulatory 
oversight helped eliminate abusive practices.150 This is not the only possible explanation—it could 
be attributable to a fall in mortgage delinquencies, for example151—but in any event, we think that 
it helps debunk the view that the increase in other types of complaints is solely attributable to an 
increase in consumer familiarity with the consumer complaint resource.  
 
In related work, Kaveh Vastani, Hamed Namavari, and Jeffrey Shaffer study in greater detail 
the narratives that consumers report to the CFPB when they file complaints.152 They too document 
interesting shifts in topic popularity over time, which experience substantial volatility over their 
year-long sample. It is hard to see how shifts consumers’ likelihood of reporting could drive these 
results. In fact, the authors suggest that regulators should do more to use the CFPB data to aid 
enforcement efforts, such as by applying machine learning techniques to consumer complaints to 
identify problems in consumer financial markets more quickly.  
 
Further support for this view that our data are picking up on overall rates of illegal behavior 
comes from analyzing the raw student loan data shown in Figure 8. In late February 2016, CFPB 
 
150 See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text.  
151 See Mortgage Delinquency Rate Trends, supra note 38. 
152 Kaveh Bastani et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for Topic Modeling of the CFPB Consumer Complaints, 
127 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPLICATIONS 256 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S095741741930154X. 
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updated its complaint form to capture information about federal student loan servicing, in addition 
to private student loan servicing.153 That precipitated an immediate increase in the count of student 
loan complaints, suggesting that learning effects flow through relatively quickly. The large spike 
in early 2017, on the other hand, reflects the criminal behavior underlying the CFPB’s major 
enforcement action against Navient, the largest student loan company in the U.S., alleging illegal 
practices that thwarted borrowers’ ability to make accelerated repayments.154 Again, the spike is 
immediate and short-lived. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that learning about 
the existence of the consumer complaint database cannot be driving the increased traffic on the 
database across many categories of consumer financial products. To the extent that learning—
about the database as a resource, about potential criminal behavior that a customer has been victim 
to—drives the decision to seek recourse, this occurs immediately.  
 
Figure 8: Raw CFPB Complaints for the Student Loan Category 
 
 
 
 
In sum, these two distinct data sources document a steady increase in complaints indicative of 
crime by financial institutions. Although we recognize that the limitations in our data do not allow 
us to say anything definitive, this evidence suggests that our enforcement regime, which in the past 
 
153 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MIDYEAR UPDATE ON STUDENT LOAN COMPLAINTS: INCOME-DRIVEN 
REPAYMENT PLAN APPLICATION ISSUES (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201608_cfpb_
StudentLoanOmbudsmanMidYearReport.pdf. 
154 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Sues Nation's Largest Student Loan Company Navient for 
Failing Borrowers at Every Stage of Repayment (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/. 
The agency alleged that the company had violated the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. Id.  
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decade has prioritized entity liability and fines over individual liability and jail time, is not 
deterring crime. 
 
C. SEC Whistleblower Tips 
 
Dodd-Frank amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to create Section 21F, which 
directs the SEC to make monetary awards available to individuals who provide original 
information that leads to successful enforcement actions against financial fraud.155 To implement 
this program, the SEC created the Office of the Whistleblower.156 The whistleblower program 
went into effect in 2011, and as Figure 9reveals, the number of tips received has increased in every 
year since inception.157 Most of these tips involve allegations about improper corporate disclosures 
and financial statements, offering fraud, or market manipulation.158 Whistleblowers have also 
helped the Commission in bringing enforcement cases involving an array of securities violations, 
including offering frauds, such as Ponzi or Ponzi-like schemes, false or misleading statements in 
a company’s offering memoranda or marketing materials, false pricing information, accounting 
violations, internal controls violations, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations, 
among other types of misconduct.  
 
Figure 9: SEC Whistleblower Tips Over Time 
 
 
 
 
155 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; see SEC, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 6. 
156 SEC Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last updated Nov. 22, 2019). 
157 The fact that the program begain in 2011 is likely why the number of tips was so much lower in that year than 
other years. 
158 SEC, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 23. 
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These data offer some support, albeit weak support, for the proposition that financial crime is 
on the rise. These tips are supposed to be filed whenever individuals observe violations of the law, 
and therefore, the more violations, the more tips we would expect to see. However, many factors 
could confound the results. As with the CFPB data, the increase could be due to heightened 
awareness of the program and the awards that successful whistleblowers can reap.159 And as in 
previous two datasets, it is likely that the tips include false positives. Indeed, in light of the massive 
awards that are possible, the incentive to file an unsubstantiated whistleblower tip might be quite 
high (although there are also many negative consequences, such as isolation at work and job loss; 
indeed, most whistleblowers go to great lengths to report and attempt to resolve wrongdoing 
internally to avoid the negative repercussions that come from whistleblowing).160 In sum, the most 
we can say is that the increased incidence of whistleblower tips offers additional support for our 
interpretation of the previous two datasets—that they indicate that financial crime is on the rise.   
 
*    * * 
 
In the last several years, we observe an increase in financial institution crime, as evidenced by 
three distinct data sources: suspicious activity reports filed by financial institutions, CFPB 
complaints made by consumers across all financial products, and whistleblower tips reported to 
the SEC. It is true that these data are necessarily responsive to the enforcement regime. For SAR 
report data in particular, it is possible that we are capturing an increase in reporting because 
institutions are more carefully policed for their failure to comply with long-standing requirements 
after the financial crisis of 2008. Likewise, our CFPB data may be picking up on increased 
consumer awareness of a new resource, and whistleblowers may be responding to increased 
financial incentives for reporting criminal behavior. We understand there are reasons to believe 
that our results conflate levels of crime with an increase in incentives for reporting bad behavior, 
but we are confident that our results are at least partially explained by an uptick in underlying 
levels of criminality. Importantly, we observe volatility in each of our dataseries—levels of 
malfeasance ebb and flow over time in a way that is inconsistent with a one-time shock to reporting 
incentives.  
 
The increase in crime is also consistent with what theory predicts would happen if enforcement 
progressed as it has in the past decade. In the wake of the financial crisis, only one guilty executive 
was sent to jail, and very few employees were prosecuted. In addition, enforcement against 
institutions was sporadic, and certain crimes—including violations of the Bank Secrecy Act—
were ignored all together. Even Gary Becker would recognize that criminals weigh the individual 
benefits of crime against the costs of bad behavior. Once the costs of offending are lowered—
because there are unlikely be any consequences from doing so—the benefits are more likely to 
outweigh them.  
 
 
159 Whistleblowers can receive 10% to 30% of any recovery in excess of $1 million. § 78u-6(b)(1); SEC, 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 6.  
160 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/8548/ (noting that a concern in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
program is the over-provision of tips because of the absence of a mechanism that imposes some cost on 
whistleblowers); Roomy Khan, Whistleblower: Warrior, Saboteur or Snitch?, FORBES (July 5, 2018, 1:03 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roomykhan/2018/07/05/whistleblower-warrior-saboteur-or-snitch/#676fa9b36362.  
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Of course, the DOJ did secure a handful of large fines against financial institutions during the 
period we studied. Were these fines large enough to make up for sporadic enforcement? We doubt 
it. The next sub-section describes our study of corporate criminal recidivism and the evidence that 
supports our interpretation of the results.  
 
D.  Recidivism and Fines  
 
We next study corporate recidivism, using public company enforcement data from Brandon 
Garrett. Garrett has studied recidivism by financial institutions, noting that federal prosecutors 
repeatedly settle criminal cases with the same banks over a short period. These financial institution 
recidivists include AIG (which was the subject of enforcement proceedings in 2004 and again in 
2006), Barclays (2010, 2012, and 2015), Crédit Suisse (2009 and 2014), HSBC (2011 and 2012), 
JP Morgan (2011, 2014, and 2015), Lloyds (2009 and 2014), the Royal Bank of Scotland (two in 
2013 and 2015), UBS (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015), and Wachovia (2010 and 2011).161 He 
suggests that this evidence of recidivism casts doubt that prosecutors take financial institution 
misconduct seriously, and that corporate penalties might not be sufficiently deterring corporate 
actors from engaging in crime.162  
 
We expand on this inquiry by studying recidivism by all publicly traded corporations over 
the last two decades, focusing on the relative size of the penalty for recidivist firms versus one-
time offenders. We define a corporate recidivist to be a public company that is prosecuted more 
than once between 2001-2018. We begin with a list of 384 corporate prosecutions naming publicly 
traded corporate defendants. We identify any fines paid by the corporations, including restitution, 
forfeiture, disgorgement of profits, and other monetary penalties and payments to enforcers in 
parallel civil suits. We normalize fines by three measures of firm size—assets, revenue, and 
employee headcount—each of which is available from Compustat. Of the 384 prosecutions, we 
matched defendants from 372 to firms in Compustat. We were also able to match five prosecutions 
to public corporations not in Compustat; we pulled assets, revenue, and headcount data for these 
firms from SEC filings, via EDGAR.163 Where possible, subsidiary firms were matched to parents, 
as long as the parent had acquired the subsidiary at the time of settlement. For international firms, 
annual assets, revenue, and headcount data were pulled from Compustat’s Global Daily 
database;164 for U.S. listed firms, from Compustat’s North American Daily database.165 As 
Compustat reports international data in local currencies, we converted size data to dollars using 
end-of-year conversion factors from FRED’s daily foreign exchange series.166 International firms 
were queried via ISIN numbers; U.S. listed firms, via CUSIPs where possible and CIK numbers 
otherwise. All dollar figures were converted to 2018 dollars using the CPI series from FRED. 
 
 
161 Garrett, Declining Bank Prosecutions, supra note 15 (manuscript at 42). 
162 Id.  
163 EDGAR Company Filings Search, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2020).  
164 Data from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) available from Wharton Research Data Services 
(available with subscription at: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/crsp/index.cfm).   
165 Data from Compustat North America available from Wharton Research Data Services (available with 
subscription at: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/crsp/index.cfm).  
166 U.S./Euro Exchange Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU 
(updated daily). 
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We maintain three different Boolean measures of procedural toughness. The first indicates 
whether an agreement required a corporate monitor; the second, periodic audits of compliance 
programs; and the third, either of the first two. In other words, we ensure that a company is not 
more likely to be a recidivist because the enforcement agency has greater knowledge about the 
company and its operations as a result of penalties secured in the first enforcement action. We 
observe in Table 1 that a recidivist is as likely to have a corporate monitor or audit imposed than 
a one-time offender, and in subsequent offenses, is actually less likely to have either imposed. 
 
Table 1: Boolean Measures of Procedural Toughness  
 
Offense Count Fraction With: Difference vs. One-Time Offenders 
  Monitors Audits 
Monitors or 
Audits 
Monitors Audits Monitors or Audits 
One-Time 
Offenders 
(N = 221) 
19.00% 14.03% 27.15% 
- - - 
(39.32%) (34.81%) (44.57%) 
Recidivists 
(N = 51) 
11.02% 9.45% 17.32% -7.98% -4.58% -9.83%* 
(31.44%) (29.37%) (37.99%) (7.28%) (7.14%) (7.57%) 
Recidivist First 
Offense 
(N = 51) 
23.5% 9.8% 27.5% 4.52% -4.22% 0.3% 
(42.84%) (30.03%) (45.07%) (7.67%) (7.17%) (7.73%) 
Recidivist Second 
Offense 
(N = 51) 
3.92% 7.84% 9.80% -15.08%*** -6.18% -17.35%*** 
(19.60%) (27.15%) (30.03%) (6.46%) (7.00%) (7.24%) 
Recidivist Third or 
Subsequent 
(N = 14) 
0.00% 12.00% 12.00% -19%**** -2.03% -15.15% 
(0.00%) (33.17%) (33.17%) (3.29%) (12.98%) (13.02%) 
 
 
After normalizing fines, we construct a measure of recidivism to gauge whether the 
increase in fines operates as a deterrence mechanism. First, we sorted the resulting public 
corporation database by unique parent entity and date. For each firm, we manually cross-
referenced prosecutions settled within one year of each other against filings provided by the 
Corporate Prosecution Registry (“CPR”); if multiple prosecutions in the CPR cited the same 
underlying malfeasance, we counted this as a single prosecution and summed the associated 
penalties. This procedure reduced the number of prosecutions from 372 to 348, implicating 272 
parent entities. Of these, 221 were one-time offenders, and 51 (or 18.7%) were recidivists. 
  
Table 2 summarizes the fines data and characteristics of recidivist and non-recidivist firms. 
Recidivists face larger penalties on average ($256 million versus $122 million for non-recidivists), 
but recidivist firms are also much larger than non-recidivist firms when measured by assets and 
revenue, as shown in Figures 9 and 10.167  
 
167 Our results are therefore consistent with CLAYPOOL, SOFT ON CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 76, at 5 (“The 
biggest corporations get the most lenience. Out of the 38 repeat offender corporations identified, 36 are major 
corporations that are on or have appeared on the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest publicly traded 
corporations. Three of the corporations have held the top slot as the largest corporation in the world – JPMorgan 
Chase (2011 and 2010), General Electric (2009) and HSBC (2008).  The two exceptions also were large, but not 
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Figure 9: Distribution of Non-Recidivist firms by Market Capitalization 
 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of Recidivist firms by Market Capitalization at First Offense 
 
 
publicly traded. Most (25 out of 38) appear in the top 500 of the 2019 Fortune Global 500 list. Half of these repeat 
offender corporations (19 out of 38) are banks or financial corporations, and the majority of those (12) are 
headquartered internationally.”).  
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As a share of assets, revenue, and total employees, recidivists in fact face less stringent 
penalties (.22% of assets for recidivists, versus 16.84% of assets for one-time offenders, or 
approximately 1/80th the size; .55% of revenue for recidivists, versus 19.28% for one-time 
offenders, or approximately 1/35th the size; 19.28% of market capitalization for one-time 
offenders, versus .42% for recidivists, or approximately 1/40th the size). Therefore, although big 
public companies pay large fines, those fines are much smaller relative to the size of fines paid by 
smaller public companies. Of course, this could be because smaller public companies commit 
worse crimes, although we suspect that these crimes are not forty to eighty times worse.  Instead, 
we believe that this suggests that an upper bound on corporate fines exist—it might not be 
politically feasible to levy a $81 billion fine on Volkswagen (or 16% of the company’s assets), for 
example.168 More importantly, it might not be legally permissible because fines are often limited 
by statute.169 
 
Table 3 shows the same data for recidivist public companies, by offense count. As one 
might expect, dollar fines increase with offense count; however, fines are more lenient (when 
measured as a percentage of assets or revenue) for second and subsequent offences than for first 
offenses. (As a percentage of market capitalization, fines are roughly the same for the first and 
 
168 Indeed, the DOJ secured only a $2.8 billion fine in the wake of the company’s emission scandal. However, this 
fine was the largest criminal fine ever negotiated between and the U.S. government and an automaker. Paul A. 
Eisenstein, Volkswagen Slapped With Largest Ever Fine for Automakers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017, 9:33 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/judge-approves-largest-fine-u-s-history-volkswagen-n749406. 
169 To take just one example, the FCPA sets the amount of entity-level fines for bribery to be $2 million for each 
violation, but states that the maximum fine can be increased to $25 million for willful violations.. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-
1, §78ff; 15 U.S.C. §78ff(a); see also Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and 
Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (2002).  
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second offenses, and smaller for the third). In other words, this evidence suggests that prosecutors 
treat recidivist firms more leniently than non-recidivists by levying lighter fines over time. What 
explains this behavior? Perhaps these later crimes are unrelated to the first, and the DOJ rightly 
believes that larger fines for later offenses would overdeter beneficial corporate activity. Another 
possibility is that criminal enforcement is a repeat game and the companies get better at negotiating 
for leniency the more times that they interact with prosecutors as defendants. Or, again, perhaps 
an upper bound exists (at least in the mind of prosecutors) that restricts the size of fines that can 
be levied on any one firm. 
 
Table 2: Penalties and Measures of Firm Size for Public Corporations 
 
  Penalty Size 
Assets 
(billions) 
Revenue 
(billions) 
Market 
Cap 
(billions) 
Employees 
Penalty/A
ssets 
Penalty/ 
Revenue 
Penalty/M
arket Cap 
Penalty/E
mployee 
One-Time 
Offenders 
(N = 221) 
 $121,822,340   $58.195   $25.960   $21.278   159,981  16.84% 19.28% 19.67%  $11,745  
 (281,613,530)  (204.222)  (69.513)  (43.451)  (1,613,137) (187.91%) (190.85%) (119.03%)  (36,908) 
Recidivists 
(N = 51) 
 $256,300,279   $587.689   $62.768   $90.338   95,835  0.22% 0.55% 0.42%  $3,628  
 (542,804,164)  (1,045.392)  (75.673)  (96.472)  (81,032) (0.44%) (0.90%) (0.75%)  (7,633) 
 
 
Table 3: Penalties and Measures of Firm Size for Recidivist Public Corporations by Offense Count 
 
Offense 
Count 
Penalty Size 
Assets 
(billions) 
Revenue 
(billions) 
Market Cap 
(billions) 
Employees 
Penalty/ 
Assets 
Penalty/ 
Revenue 
Penalty/ 
Market 
Cap 
Penalty/ 
Employee 
First 
(N = 51) 
 $222,574,165   $578.783   $60.498   $85.674   93,952  0.28% 0.61% 0.42%  $3,361  
 (377,586,052)  $(1,125.576)  $(73.076)  $(103.491)  (89,501) (0.57%) (0.95%) (0.64%)  (5,568) 
Second 
(N = 51) 
 $224,049,474   $524.653   $57.176   $82.903   90,641  0.18% 0.55% 0.46%  $3,436  
 (429,222,645)  $(1,003.668)  $(69.937)  $(84.846)  (81,748) (0.31%) (0.93%) (0.88%)  (7,441) 
Third or 
Subsequent 
(N = 14) 
 $390,893,194   $734.450   $78.808   $114.722   110,270  0.14% 0.41% 0.35%  $4,567  
 (917,879,780)  $(984.034)  $(91.667)  $(103.352)  (59,832) (0.33%) (0.74%) (0.67%)  (11,173) 
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In sum, our study of public company recidivism indicates that there may be an upper bound 
on the size of the fine levied on any public company. Smaller public companies are subject to 
higher relative fines than their larger public company counterparts, and they are also less likely to 
offend again. By contrast, larger public companies are more likely to receive a small fine, and 
more likely to offend again, than smaller firms.  Indeed, the largest firms in our sample were most 
likely to be subject to several enforcement actions during our sample period. Public Citizen 
reported in 2019 that of the 38 repeat offenders they were able to identify, 36 were on the Forbes 
2000 list; and three had held the top spot as the largest corporation in the world.170 Again, this 
could be because large firms have more opportunities to offend (more employees, more business 
activity) or have more difficulty policing their ranks. Or perhaps they are equally likely to offend 
but are more likely to be pursued by the DOJ when they do.  The latter hypothesis is particularly 
compelling, as prosecutors likely garner more fame and attention from prosecutions against large 
companies.  This reality likely contributes to our results, but the fact that relative fines are so much 
lower for large firms than smaller firms also suggests that the first penalty may not serve as a 
sufficient deterrent. 
 
As additional support for that view, we observe an increase in recidivism between 2001 
and 2018. In particular, as Figure 11 reveals, the share of crimes committed by recidivist 
companies jumps from 7% in 2010 to 28% in 2011 and continues to rise after that, hitting a high 
point of 50% in 2015. This means that a greater share of prosecutions involved companies that had 
offended before after the financial crisis than before. As Table 1 explains, this result is not 
explained by the presence of a corporate monitor or audit requirement in the first prosecution. In 
addition, although the growth of recidivism in the early years of our sample is not surprising—in 
2002, for example, there were fewer years to commit crimes and be deemed a recidivist—the shift 
at the end of the sample is indicative of a real trend. Before 2010, the share of crimes committed 
by someone who committed a crime in any of the prior years was very low—only 7%. The next 
year, the share of recidivist crimes jumps up even as total crime falls. In sum, this indicates that 
there is an increase in recidivism in that year that is neither explained by enforcement nor our 
definition of recidivism. And that jump persists for the next six years, even as overall enforcement 
falls. 
 
Figure 11: Number of Corporate Prosecutions and Recidivist Prosecutions 
 
 
170 We find more recidivists because our sample period is larger and also our matching of subsidiaries to parent 
firms potentially more precise. CLAYPOOL, SOFT ON CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 76, at 42.   
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 In sum, corporate recidivism appears to be on the rise, even as the number of enforcement 
actions declines. And our results indicate a potential cause: recidivist penalties become more 
lenient over time. In addition, larger companies receive more lenient fines than smaller companies, 
and those larger companies are more likely to offend again. Our analysis therefore indicates that 
the use of fines by federal enforcers may be resulting in sub-optimal deterrence, especially for the 
largest companies.   
 
IV. Implications  
  
 Part II shows show that three proxies for crime by financial institutions indicate that 
financial crime is on the rise. This suggests that the DOJ’s enforcement regime that privileges 
entity liability over individual liability, and high fines over jail time, is not adequately deterring 
crime by financial institutions.  Of course, it is possible that rising crime levels would be consistent 
with an optimal deterrence regime. As discussed, the optimal level of crime is not zero, and perhaps 
there was too much deterrence (and too little crime) in the period before our sample. However, we 
do not think this is likely for a few reasons. For one, the 2008 financial crisis precedes our sample, 
and many commentators view lax regulatory oversight and policing of fraud and misconduct as a 
contributing factor to the global economic collapse.171 In other words, it is unlikely that the state 
was overdeterring financial institution misconduct in the period preceding the financial crisis. 
Compounding this view is the evidence that, before 2008, prosecutions of banks were quite rare. 
 
171 See, e.g., Maria Krambia-Kapardis, Financial Crisis, Fraud, and Corruption, in CORPORATE FRAUD AND 
CORRUPTION: A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES 5, 5-38 (2016); NICHOLAS RYDER, THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PERFECT STORM? (2014); Henry Pontell et al., Too Big to Fail, 
Too Powerful to Jail? On the Absence of Criminal Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 1 (2014), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-013-9476-4 (all describing fraud, 
corruption and corporate crime as contributing factors to national and global financial crises). 
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Indeed, from 2001-2007, the DOJ only brought thirty-four enforcement actions against financial 
institutions—most of which were settled.172  
 
 We suspect that increasing crime levels indicate that the federal enforcement regime is not 
effectively deterring misconduct by financial institutions. And this is so despite the fact that 
financial institutions are increasingly penalized with large fines. Our results in Section IIID. 
provide a possible explanation as to why these fines may be inadequately deterring future incidents 
of misconduct. High fines adequately deter crime when they are set equal to the social cost of the 
crime, multiplied by the probability of detection.173 But, this is not how fines are calculated. Not 
only that, the overall size of the fine is often subject to a ceiling174, and our results confirm this 
reality: while smaller public companies bear fines that are a large percentage of their assets, 
revenue, and market capitalization, larger public companies bear fines that are approximately 
eighty times smaller on average. It is possible that optimal enforcement might be compromised by 
the political feasibility of levying massive fines that approximate the true cost of the organization’s 
malfeasance. For example, massive fines ultimately penalize innocent shareholders, making 
enforcers wary to come down too hard on them.175 In addition, enforcement agencies may be 
limited by statutes that cap the amount of fines that can be sought. And these limits—whether 
political or legal—mean that companies often view the prospect of offending as simply another 
cost of doing business—and a reasonable cost at that. 
 
Not only that, law and economics scholars have underestimated the practical limits on the 
corporation’s ability to adequately deter future incidents of crime.176 As discussed, the law and 
economics literature favors entity-level fines because the corporation will often be a more efficient 
provider of detection and prevention efforts than the state.177 In this case, when the entity bears a 
large fine, the individuals who bear it will induce the entity to implement the necessary reforms 
up to the appropriate level. For large public companies, those affected individuals are shareholders. 
In theory, shareholders of companies subjected to large fines should demand reforms of corporate 
practices consistent with law and economics theory. However, rationally apathetic shareholders 
might not recognize the problem nor understand how to address it.178 Even if they did, highly 
diversified shareholders might not mind the penalty and may even prefer and reward fiduciaries 
 
172 Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. F. 33, app. A at 49-50 (2016) [hereinafter 
Garrett, Rise of Bank Prosecutions]. 
173 See supra Part IIID. 
174 See id. 
175 See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 90.  
176 Shavell and Polinsky provide the classic view, that “if firms are made strictly liable for their harms, they will 
design rewards and punishments for their employees that will lead employees to reduce the risk of harm, since firms 
will want to reduce their liability payments.” Polinsky & Shavell, Should Employees be Subject to Fines?, supra 
note 48, at 240.  
177 See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 23. 
178 See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986) (discussing rational apathy among 
shareholders); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 536-42 (1990). Of 
course, the modern corporation’s shareholder base is largely comprised of institutional investors with large stakes in 
the underlying company. In theory, the presence of large and sophisticated investors could ameliorate our concerns, 
however, there is evidence that agency problems may compromise the efforts of even these investors. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 
COL. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794; Sean J. Griffith & 
Dorothy S. Lund, Toward a Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3422910. 
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for engaging in misconduct: more risk means higher returns, and that benefit would likely 
outweigh the cost of the penalty imposed on a single firm in the portfolio from time to time.   
 
In addition, the ultimate deterrent effect of fines against corporations and their shareholders 
may be muted by several factors. For example, although a company’s stock price falls after the 
imposition of the penalty, it usually bounces back very quickly.179 Therefore, shareholders might 
not demand an appropriate reduction in activity levels, nor the right amount of firm-wide 
monitoring, to avoid future instances of crime.180  
 
Indeed, the most important assumptions underlying the Beckerian framework—the framework 
that has influenced decades of scholarship as well as enforcement practice—often break down in 
the real world. As discussed, it might not be possible to estimate the “costs” of punishment like a 
prison sentence. The Beckerian response is grounded in economic principles: the costs of prison 
to the imprisoned are the discounted stream of cashflows that they would have earned outside of 
prison.181 We suspect that this answer strikes non-economists as misguided at best—it is unlikely 
that any incarcerated person would identify foregone earnings as the best measure of the cost of 
their prison term. It also leads to unjust outcomes: prison is more “costly” a punishment for white-
collar criminals than their blue-collar counterparts because their foregone earnings are larger.  
Beyond these flaws, any attempt to measure foregone earnings as Becker would prescribe would 
be riddled with guesses and ultimately, errors. Relying on such a measure to calibrate enforcement, 
therefore, is problematic on multiple levels.  
 
In addition, our data indicates that there is likely to be a larger deviation between the Beckerian 
optimal fine and the fine that is levied for large relative to small institutions. Small institutions are 
more likely to bear fines that are a larger percentage of their assets and revenue. For large 
institutions, fines sting like parking tickets, and this is indeed how they are described by the 
companies that bear them. Perversely, therefore, the U.S. enforcement regime is treating the largest 
institutions more leniently than smaller institutions, despite the fact that large institutions are more 
likely to commit crimes that result in widely felt public harm. 
 
Whether we are relying on the right framework and set of assumptions to calibrate enforcement 
is a critically important question. The financial crisis of 2008 nearly brought down the global 
economy and cost the United States $22 trillion.182 Measures of white collar crime in the U.S. 
estimate that it costs anywhere from $426 billion to $1.7 trillion annually.183 In other words, 
 
179 Matthews, supra note 49. 
180 See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 16, at 326 (noting that shareholders are often not in the most effective position to 
reform corporate practices). It is true that the consequences of penalties may be larger than the direct financial costs 
suffered by the corporation. There are reputational harms associated with behavior that is tagged by enforcement 
agencies as meriting large-dollar fines. Consumers may distrust a corporation who is punished publicly for 
malfeasance, and choose to take their business elsewhere. But again, these harms will be primarly felt by 
shareholders. And our results indicate that fines plus these more amorphous consequences of any financial xfpenalty 
are not sufficiently deterring financial crime.  
181 See Becker, supra note 19, at 170.  
182 See Regis Barnichon et al., The Financial Crisis at 10: Will We Ever Recover?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. 
(Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/august/financial-
crisis-at-10-years-will-we-ever-recover/. 
183 J.C. HELMKAMP ET AL., NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. TRAINING & RESEARCH INST., HOW MUCH DOES 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME COST? (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=167026. 
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corporate crime affects all of us—as consumers of products, employees of companies, and 
investors who increasingly save for retirement via the stock market.184 Critics of corporate criminal 
liability have focused too much on the harm to shareholders when corporations are forced to pay 
fines,185 and too little on the harm to the entire economy when corporate crime is not effectively 
deterred.186  
 
However, we recognize that we cannot answer the ultimate normative question with our data 
alone, which primarily focus on crime by financial institutions. Therefore, our primary 
recommendation is to urge the government to do what it does for all other types of crime and study 
corporate crime levels, or at least, supply additional data for researchers to use. In other words, we 
argue that it is time to abandon an enforcement system guided by law and economics theory, and 
move to a system informed by data. This would enable a better understanding of what aspects of 
the federal enforcement regime are failing, and where additional attention and resources should be 
directed. 
 
Data on non-white collar crime provide a hint of where to begin. National Incident Based-
Reports are used by law enforcement agencies for collecting and reporting data on crimes.187 They 
are primarily used by local and state law enforcement agencies monitoring “street crime,” and the 
data reflects these preferences.188 The white-collar criminal reporting data are quite limited, and 
was last collected in 1983.189 More helpful are data collected by Brandon Garrett, which compiles 
information about corporate enforcement at the federal level. These data have aided the efforts of 
many researchers seeking to better understand corporate criminal enforcement, including our own. 
But Professor Garrett acknowledges that from his data we can only extrapolate a rough guess of 
overall crime rates.  
 
We recognize that estimating crime levels is a daunting task, but we believe that it is one that 
government agencies could tackle. Most ambitiously, the government could produce and make 
available to the public and researchers a comprehensive registry of corporate malfeasance, as it 
does for other types of crime. But there are intermediate steps that could help internal and outside 
researchers evaluate the efficacy of enforcement. For one, it would be useful for the government 
to track and make publicly available incidences of corporate crime that prosecutors are suspicious 
occurred, but choose not to pursue through enforcement actions. Data on leniency programs, such 
as the program run by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, which allows corporations and individuals 
who self-report bad behavior to avoid criminal conviction, would also provide useful information. 
Finally, the government could release data detailing the claims reported by corporate 
whistleblowers. Although anonymity for individuals and firms contributes to the willingness to 
self-report, the choice of anonymity over data access has significant consequences for our 
understanding of the landscape of corporate crime. The tradeoffs should be weighed carefully.  
 
184 WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW (2016). 
185 See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN UPDATE, supra note 91 (“Overly harsh penalties against the corporate entity will merely 
incentivize its best professionals to jump ship, while innocent shareholders and local communities are left holding 
the bag as the company is destroyed or permanently crippled.”).  
186 See supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text.  
187 CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING (UCR) DATA 2 (2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf. 
188 Id. at 6. 
189 Id. at 2; see MANSON, supra note 27. 
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We also offer suggestions for academics studying this question with the limited data that exist. 
For one, exogenous shocks to corporate crime regimes provide an opportunity to study how legal 
regime change alters corporate behavior. Several studies have relied on shocks to study corporate 
compliance (e.g., following Arthur Andersen’s demise, which forced corporations to change 
auditors190) and insider trading.191 Future work could follow a similar approach to study changes 
in criminal enforcement. Making use of exogenous shifts in legal environment and tracing out their 
impact on reported crime will not paint a full picture of corporate crime levels, but they can help 
provide micro-level evidence on the pervasiveness of corporate crime, as well as the consequences 
for corporate institutions of our under (or over) deterring it.   
 
Beyond exploiting exogenous shifts to trace out causal relationships between legal institutions 
and crime levels, researchers can be creative about aggregating data from a variety of sources to 
draw inferences about corporate criminal behavior. In this Article, we have reported data from 
surveys of corporate crime incidence, complaints of corporate customers, self-reporting on 
malfeasance by firms, and government data on corporate prosecutions. And this is just the tip of 
the iceberg. There is much more that could be done, for example by working with individual firms 
to acquire proprietary data about internal employee malfeasance. 
 
For too long, scholars have been hamstrung by a belief that it is impossible to develop a 
measure of corporate crime, and so have been discouraged from an inquiry like ours. And we do 
not intend to minimize the challenging nature of this task. Our hope is to encourage others to 
engage with the messiness of the data that exists—and to push for new data sources made available 
by private and public actors—so that we can attempt to measure the level of criminal behavior by 
corporate actors, and how it responds to evolving legal regimes.  
 
And if these studies confirm our results that financial crime is on the rise, the answer would 
seem to be clear: an enforcement regime that is limited in its ability to levy fines at an optimal 
level must rely on other forms of punishment to increase deterrence. Not only that, for widely held 
public companies, even massive fines may not have the intended effect if shareholders are unlikely 
to demand the necessary reforms. Therefore, enforcement agencies may need to move away from 
fines as the sole means of achieving optimal deterrence. With that in mind, we offer a few 
suggestions for policy reform that could strengthen the impact of any given criminal penalty.  
 
As a threshold matter, we recognize that enforcement agencies are resource constrained and 
are unable to pursue charges in every instance of corporate misconduct. Therefore, we understand 
that enforcement agencies might be limited in the number of charges that they can bring, and the 
number of cases that they can take to trial. That being said, there are a range of actions that 
enforcement agencies can take to increase the deterrence punch of any criminal penalty. First, the 
DOJ could take steps to try and minimize the risk of future crime by the organization, perhaps by 
seeking governance reforms or even imposing a corporate monitor. At one point in time, these 
sorts of arrangements were popular with the DOJ, but they have recently gone out of favor with 
 
190 Dyck, supra note 33. 
191 Diane Del Guercio, et al., The Deterrence Effect of SEC Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading:  
Evidence From Run-up Before News Events, 60 J. L. & ECON. 269 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1784528. 
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the agency.192 However, other enforcers continue to make good use of them. Consider the Federal 
Reserve’s historic settlement with Wells Fargo in the aftermath of its fraudulent account scandal. 
Wells Fargo was disallowed from growth until it agreed to improve its governance and controls, 
which included replacing four members of its Board who failed in their supervisory roles.193  This 
punishment was lauded as appropriately severe: a rare case when the central bank chose to impose 
strict limits on a major bank’s growth, and where prosecution resulted in direct consequences for 
the bank’s leadership.194 
 
In addition, the DOJ could find additional ways to increase the severity of criminal punishment 
(aside from levying higher fines), thereby enhancing both general and specific deterrence. We 
address two possibilities: using shaming mechanisms and seeking penalties against guilty 
individuals. 
 
First, enforcement agencies could more aggressively shame entities that commit crime. This 
has been a popular suggestion among academics for several decades,195 and we occasionally see 
enforcement agencies embracing such policies—recall that PG&E was required to advertise its 
criminality.196 For corporate executives, the prospect of public shame—even at the entity level— 
is likely a powerful deterrent.197 Shaming mechanisms that target the corporation can affect 
consumers of products made by the offending firm, which may affect the company’s bottom line. 
In addition, shaming mechanisms may have an impact on the company’s investors. Indeed, 
shareholders are increasingly looking to invest in companies that share their values;198 for that 
reason, advertising that the company is a criminal may have a greater effect today than ever before. 
Therefore, shaming mechanisms may chill investors from purchasing equity or debt from the 
criminal entity, increasing the company’s cost of capital. One qualification, however, is that 
 
192See Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. to Reduce Use of Monitors in Corporate Settlements,  WALL ST. J.: RISK & 
COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 15, 2018 4:12 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/10/15/u-s-to-reduce-use-of-
monitors-in-corporate-settlements/. Largely descriptive work exists on the potential importance of corporate 
monitorships, but relatively little exists by way of measuring the extent to which monitors deter future criminal 
behavior. See, e.g., Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 110 (2016), 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1482&context=yjreg; Khanna, The Corporate 
Monitor, supra note 79. Our perusal of the data on corporate settlements indicates that the presence of a monitor is 
not deterring future malfeasance; future work should take a closer look at whether and how the presence of a 
corporate monitor enhances deterrence.  
193 Flitter et al. 2018. 
194 Id. 
195 See David A. Skeel Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2181&context=faculty_scholarship; Jayne W. 
Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959 (1999); BRENT FISSE & JOHN 
BRAITHWAIE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (SUNY Press, 1983). But see V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, supra note 55, at 1503 (1996) (pointing out that 
reputational penalties create social costs). 
196 See PG&E Press Release, supra note 1. 
197 See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 195. Shaming mechanisms for guilty white-collar criminals are not 
currently allowed under the Sentencing Guidelines, and some have advocated for their use. See Daniel M. Kahan & 
Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 
J. L. & Econ. 365 (1999).  
198 See, e.g., Annual Letter from Larry Fink, CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance (Jan. 
2020) (available at: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter); Emile Hallez, 
BofA Starts Selling Benefits Packages to Corporate Banking Customers, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190712/FREE/190719972. 
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shaming mechanisms may be less effective in the context of financial institution defendants. 
Financial relationships are sticky, and thus the consequences of repuatational harm are likely to be 
less severe in this setting than in others. 199  
 
A second way to increase the severity of punishment would be to charge guilty individuals.200  
While this approach appears extreme, it has many advantages. In particular, it would ensure that 
there is no disconnect between the recipient of the punishment and the bad actor, increasing the 
likelihood of both general and specific deterrence.201 But critics of individual liability would likely 
point out that is very difficult and expensive for enforcement agencies to prosecute individuals. 
Often, in the wake of a corporate scandal, it is challenging to determine who was responsible for 
the crime. Corporate decisionmaking is often diffuse, made by many different actors at different 
levels, which makes it difficult to hold any individual responsible beyond a reasonable doubt.202  
Not only that, it can be difficult to distinguish beneficial corporate risk taking from intentional 
criminal activity.203 And often, the only ties that can be clearly drawn between individuals and 
malfeasance are of low-level employees, rather than those executives who create cultures that 
foster criminality. This is why the only investment banker in the U.S. to go to jail following the 
crisis was a mid-level executive.204 Drawing a line between criminal behavior encouraged by a 
problematic corporate culture and top executives is often impossible, and so additional individual-
level prosecutions alone, without finding a way to ascribe indirect liability to those at the top, is 
likely to fall hardest on regular employees who follow orders, rather than top brass leadership who 
make them.205 As another illustration of this reality, consider the following: former Wells Fargo 
CEO John Stumpf testified in September 2016 to the Senate about how the firm rapidly responded 
to the fake accounts scandal by noting that 5,300 low-level bankers and tellers had been fired for 
 
199 Cf. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Customers Are Fed Up. They Could Yank Billions of Dollars in Deposits, CNN BUS. 
(Oct. 10, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/business/wells-fargo-bank-customers-
scandal/index.html. However, there are few corporate scandals that rise to the level of Wells Fargo’s fake accounts. 
In general, banking relationships are extremely sticky. Mark J. Flannery & Christopher M. James, Market Evidence 
on the Effective Maturity of Bank Assets and Liabilities, 16 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 435 (1984), 
 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1992182?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
200 For a forceful argument in favor of jail time for guilty indiviudals, see Rena Steinzor, WHY NOT JAIL?: 
INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE MALFEASANCE, AND GOVERNMENT INACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2014).  
201 Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 80 FED. PROB. 33 (2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/80_3_4_0.pdf; see also Honorable Jed Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Judge, S. Dist. 
of N.Y., Address at the NYU School of Law Conference on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing (Apr. 17, 
2015) (video of event available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fw8Y2hqyOrk) (“What I fear most is not 
going after the people who done it. That’s important for deterrence purposes. It’s important for accountability 
purposes. It avoids all of the difficult questions when you just go after the corporation — are you hurting the 
shareholders, who are, in most cases, totally innocent? How much are you really achieving? What is the deterrent 
effect? How much can you change corporate culture? All of those questions seem to me to be quite secondary to the 
approach of prosecuting the people who actually committed the crime.”).  
202 SAMUEL BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA'S CORPORATE AGE xv 
(2016) (discussing diffusion of responsibility within an organization as one of several difficulties in corporate 
liability).  
203 Id.  
204 Jesse Eisinger, The Fall Guy, NY TIMES MAG., Apr. 30, 2014, at 34 [hereinafter Eisinger, Fall Guy], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html.  
205 The reality that low-level employees often take the brunt of criminal investigations is unfortunate for another 
reason: it makes it much more difficult for companies to manage compliance and may discourage reporting. 
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their actions since 2011.206 His resignation came only a month later and was a response to missteps 
before the Senate during this testimony, rather than accountability for the scandal directly.207 
 
With these issues in ascribing liability to top executives and proving charges, prosecutors may 
be wary to pursue individuals. Indeed, it is far easier to secure a high-profile win by settling with 
the entity. In that moment, the entity’s management may even be in cahoots with the prosecutors: 
the agency secures a large fine, and the guilty individuals avoid the risk of personal liability.  
 
If it is currently too difficult and expensive for agencies to prosecute high-level individuals, 
then it might be helpful to reform the criminal justice system to increase the likelihood of a win 
when individuals are charged. The fact that the Yates memo had no real effect on enforcement 
activity demonstrates that something more is necessary than a policy shift from the top.208 Along 
these lines, Senator Warren has introduced a bill that would authorize prosecution of an executive 
officer of any corporation that generates more than $1 billion in annual revenue for negligently 
permitting or failing to prevent a criminal or civil violation by the company that affects “the health, 
safety, finances, or personal data” of more than one percent of the population.209 Put simply, 
Senator Warren wants to enable prosecutors to hold negligent corporate executives criminally 
responsible for corporate crimes that affect a large number of people.210  
 
This is a controversial proposal. A bedrock of our criminal justice system is that an individual 
who acts without mens rea is not liable under criminal law—indeed, criminal justice reformers 
have focused on increasing the burden on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s guilty mental state.211 
The Warren proposal would replace requisite intent with a much lower standard, requiring only 
that a corporate executive be negligent. The benefit is that doing so could entice federal prosecutors 
to pursue high-level individuals by easing the prospect of a victory. However, concerns about 
overdeterrence abound—qualified executives may avoid beneficial risk taking or even refuse to 
work for large companies to avoid the risk of penalties for negligent action. Or, they might do 
 
206 John Stumpf, Chairman & CEO of Wells Fargo, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 20, 2016) (transcript available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/09/19/business/dealbook/document-wells-fargo-stumpf-prepared-testimony.html). 
207 Matt Egan et al., Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Is Out, CNN (Oct. 12, 2016, 7:31 PM), https://money.cnn.com
/2016/10/12/investing/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-retires/index.html. 
208 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.  
209 Anello, supra note 14.  
210 Senator Warren also proposed the “Ending Too Big to Jail Act,” which would have focused enforcement 
resources on financial institutions in three main ways (the bill was proposed in March 2018 and died in committee). 
First, the bill would have created a permanent law enforcement agency within the Treasury Department charged 
with investigating financial institution fraud. Second, the bill would have required certain financial institution 
executives to certify that the institution had not committed criminal conduct or civil fraud. And third, the bill would 
have required courts to make a determination that DPAs are in the public interest before allowing them to go 
forward. See Lev L. Dassin et al., Bill Proposal—Corporate Executives Criminally Accountable for Negligent 
Conduct, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2019/04/18/bill-proposal-corporate-executives-criminally-accountable-for-negligent-conduct/. 
211 Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 491 (2019); see also 
GENE HEALY, GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING 65 (2004) (arguing for the 
abolishment of strict liability, which dispenses with the mens rea requirement, because it is “completely inconsistent 
with the Anglo-American tradition”).  
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more to cover their tracks.212 The issue is that we do not necessarily want to punish negligent action 
criminally, but only willful and knowing misconduct or even recklessness; however, such cases 
are harder for prosecutors to prove.213  On balance, therefore, reform of this kind would help ensure 
that high-level individuals are held responsible for corporate action that results in grave social 
harm.214  
 
Of course, easing the prospect of individual criminal liability might not be necessary if other 
mechanisms existed to hold bad actors (or the people who facilitate and encourage their 
misconduct) accountable. Accordingly, legislators could enact civil penalties for guilty executives 
who preside over agents who commit crimes. Take FDIC Rule 380.7 as an example, which was 
adopted as part of Dodd-Frank.215 Under that rule, the FDIC can claw back up to two years of 
compensation from current and former senior executives and directors who are found 
“substantially responsible” for the failure of a financial institution.216 The rule also adopts a 
presumption of responsibility if the manager had responsibility for the “strategic, policymaking or 
company-wide operational decisions of the covered financial company,” which includes the CEO, 
CFO, president, and chairman of the board of directors.217 A similar rule could clawback the 
compensation of managers with substantial responsibility for the operations of a company that is 
convicted of a crime that results in major public harm.  
 
Likewise, legislators could implement certification requirements akin to that imposed under 
Section 302 of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act of 2002. That rule directed the SEC to adopt rules to 
require the top executive and financial officers at public companies to certify that the company’s 
annual and quarterly reports were accurate and complete. The SEC rule enforces this requirement 
with civil penalties for false certification, and also provides that if the false certification was 
“willfully” provided, the SEC can refer the case to the DOJ for possible criminal prosecution. As 
 
212 This point has been made with respect to criminal prosecutions against Boeing and its executives for failure to 
address deficiencies in the 737 Max that led to deadly plane crashes. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris et al., Will Boeing 
Face U.S. Criminal Charges for 737 Max Crashes?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2019, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/manufacturing/will-boeing-face-criminal-charges-737-max-crashes (Kenneth 
Quinn, former Chief Counsel of the Federal Aviation Administration, notes that “[the FAA] want[s] to encourage 
people to come forward and admit mistakes, free from fear of reprisal or jail . . . the last thing the industry and FAA 
needs is the specter of a criminal investigation hovering over an accident inquiry.”) 
213 However, in some instances, the guilty state of mind may be clear. To take a recent example, there is evidence 
that Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg knew about problems with the 737 Max after the first crash. Dennis 
Muilenburg, CEO, Boeing, Remarks Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
(video available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/watch-boeings-ceo-dennis-muilenburg-testify-before-
congress-on-737-max-crashes.html). This admission could support criminal charges against him, as well as charges 
against the company. Van Voris, supra note 212. If the charges are not ultimately brought, it suggests that 
something other than the difficulties associated with prosecution may be responsible for the lack of charges against 
high-level executives. 
214 Note that under the Responsible Corporate Office Doctrine, “criminal liability can be expanded to executives 
whose subordinates engage in criminal activity, even if the executives are not aware of it, so long as the executives 
can be deemed responsible for the actors who commit the crime.” Dassin et al., supra note 210. However, this 
doctrine has been applied narrowly “in the context of offenses against the public health and welfare.” Id.  
215 Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41626, 41628 (July 15, 2011). 
216 Id. 
217 See Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following 
Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, 17 STAN J. L. BUS. & FIN. 224 (2012), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12275&context=journal_articles. 
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part of that criminal prosecution, the DOJ could secure fines of up to $5 million and up to twenty 
years in jail.218 This rule helpfully induces executives to play a greater role in oversight of financial 
statements, and also eases the prospect of charges against executives who participated in financial 
statement manipulation or failed to monitor those who did.219 Legislators could make greater use 
of certification requirements in other contexts, such as by requiring executives at financial 
institutions to certify that the institution is not engaging in crimes that could result in systemic 
harm. 
 
Even without new legislation, firms could proactively adopt some reforms themselves: for 
example, they could require corporate executives to provide a share of their salary to a fund used 
to pay any criminal fines that accrue to the firm during their tenure, or they could provide that in 
the event of a criminal conviction or unfavorable settlement, all executives and directors would 
forfeit their compensation for that year (and possibly even prior years).  However, even in cases 
when executives lose their jobs due to malfeasance that occurs on their watch, such punishment is 
uncommon: when John Stumpf was forced to retire under pressure from Wells Fargo, he did so 
with a pre-tax payout of more than $80 million in stock and other compensation.220 Executive 
compensation is notoriously sticky and difficult to confiscate. As an additional example, consider 
that during the financial crisis, when insurance giant American International Group was receiving 
government funds because it was precariously close to failure, it simultaneously paid over $200 
million in bonuses to its employees.221  Standing in the way of company-level reform of this kind 
are concerns that denying executives their compensation will make it harder for the company to 
recruit high-quality management who are averse to potential negative shocks to their individual 
income.222 In our mind, that is a feature of such a proposal, not a bug. It is our hope that risk-averse 
individuals who sit atop complex organizations that are difficult to monitor externally feel 
compelled to exercise caution and supervise their employees thoughtfully. However, it will be 
important to design these rules in ways that encourage, rather than discourage, executives to 
identify and self-report bad behavior.223 Along those lines, shareholders (or legislators) could 
require executives to conduct due diligence and certify that employees are complying with the 
law.224  
 
 
218 Final Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-8124 (Aug. 22, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8124.htm. 
219 For a critical take on certification requirements, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance? Officer Certification 
and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 
(2002), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=faculty_publications. 
220 This trend may be changing. See Vanessa Romo, CBS Denies Former CEO Les Moonves $120 Million Severance 
Package, NPR (Dec. 12, 2018, 7:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/677587813/cbs-denies-former-ceo-les-
moonves-120-million-severance-package.   
221Geithner 2014. This provoked outrage from politicians on both sides of the aisle, including President Obama, who 
noted that “it’s hard to understand how derivative traders at AIG warranted any bonuses, much less $164 million in 
extra pay. How do they justify this outrage to taxpayers who are keeping the company afloat?” Id. 
222 Cf. In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, 76 (2011) (citing In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del Ch. 2009)) (explaining that expansive liability “could potentially chill the [ability 
of corporations to retain the] service of qualified directors”). 
223 As in other contexts, it will be important to reward cooperation with enforcement authorities in order to reduce 
the incentive to conceal bad acts.  
224 Elizabeth Warren proposed this course of action for financial institution executives in her Too Big to Jail Act. See 
id.  
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Again, it is too early to say which of these reforms would be most beneficial. In the meantime, 
we urge researchers and other scholars to study this important question: Is corporate crime on the 
rise?  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This Article takes important steps toward determining whether financial crime is on the 
rise. Our analysis of three distinct and novel data sources indicates that aggregate levels of certain 
types of misconduct by financial institutions has risen in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.  
And our study of corporate criminal recidivism suggests a cause:  an over-reliance on fines as a 
penalty. Although law and economics theory predicts that fines can adequately and efficiently 
deter crime by corporate agents, our results confirm that there exists an upper bound on fines that 
are imposed on firms. In addition, the shareholders that ultimately pay for misconduct when the 
entity is fined may not be able or willing to demand necessary changes. Our principal normative 
recommendation is for the government to supply, and researchers to analyze, better data on this 
subject. And if our results are confirmed after further study, the answer is clear: an enforcement 
regime that is limited in its ability to levy fines at an optimal level must rely on other forms of 
punishment—such as the imposition of liability on guilty individuals—to increase deterrence. 
Only then will corporate criminal punishment be seen as something more than a cost of doing 
business. 
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